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IN  A WELL-KNOWN  PAPER  in one of the inaugural  issues of the Brookings 
Papers,  Robert Hall posed the question "Why Is the Unemployment 
Rate So High  at Full Employment?"  1 Hall, writing  in the context of the 
3.5 percent unemployment  rate that prevailed in 1969, answered his 
question  by explaining  that  the  full-employment  rate  was so high  because 
of the normal  turnover  that is inevitable  in a dynamic  economy where 
some sectors are expanding  and others are contracting  and because of 
the special problems  of certain  disadvantaged  groups. Hall himself  was 
pessimistic about the prospects for maintaining  unemployment  consis- 
tently below 4 percent  through  expansionary  policies. But he raised  the 
prospect  that  successful  structural  policies  could  do so. While  aspirations 
became  attuned  to expectations  as unemployment  rose during  the 1970s, 
the Humphrey-Hawkins  Full Employment  and  Balanced  Growth  Act of 
1978  nonetheless  set an unemployment  target  of 4 percent  for 1983. 
Today,  four  yeSws  into an  economic  recovery, the unemployment  rate 
hovers around 7 percent. Over the past decade, it has averaged 7.6 
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1. Robert  E. Hall, "Why  Is the Unemployment  Rate  So High  at Full  Employment?," 
BPEA, 3:1970, pp. 369-402. The title of this paper  is patterned  after Hall's title. The 
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about  just how close the American  economy  currently  is to full  employment. 
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percent  and  has never  fallen  below 5.8 percent.  Even most  forecasts  that 
call for steady  growth  over the next five years do not foresee unemploy- 
ment rates dipping  back below 6 percent. It is helpful to recall that 
unemployment  peaked  at 7.2 percent  during  the relatively  severe reces- 
sion  of 1958.  While  some of the difference  between  recent  and  past  levels 
of unemployment  has resulted from cyclical developments, it is clear 
that  a substantial  increase  in the normal  or natural  rate  of unemployment 
has taken place. Where  Kennedy-Johnson  economists set 4 percent as 
an interim  full-employment  target, contemporary  policymakers  would 
regard  even the temporary  achievement  of 6 percent  unemployment  as 
a great  success. 
This paper  describes and explains the substantial  recent increase in 
normal  unemployment.  The first  part  of the paper  assesses the relation- 
ship between unemployment and other indicators of  labor market 
tightness  and describes changes in the composition  of the unemployed 
population.  The data reveal that the level of unemployment  consistent 
with any given level of vacancies, capacity utilization, or change in 
inflation  has increased significantly  over time. It appears  that little of 
this movement  can be traced  to measurement  difficulties  in the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics' Current  Population  Survey. Rather, increases in 
unemployment  are a serious problem because they are concentrated 
among mature men, job losers, and the long-term  unemployed. The 
portrayal  of rising  unemployment  as the consequence of an increase in 
the share  of secondary  workers  in the labor  force  that  was popular  during 
the 1970s  is no longer  accurate. 
The second and more speculative part of the paper draws on the 
dramatic  variations  in state and regional economic performance  that 
have taken place over the past fifteen years in an effort to get at the 
causes of rising unemployment.  It links observed increases in unem- 
ployment with structural  changes in the economy that have lowered 
employment  in high-wage  sectors and  increased  it in low-wage sectors. 
The structural  changes  include  both macroeconomic  developments  that 
have reduced the demand  for the output of high-wage  industries  and 
labor market pressures, particularly  in unionized sectors, that have 
pushed up wages in sectors where they were already  high. I conclude 
that reversing  the dramatic  sectoral shocks of the last few years can 
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Increasing Unemployment  in the United States 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the total U.S. unemployment  rate 
and  the unemployment  rate  for married  men since the Korean  War.  The 
fairly  steady increase  in both rates is interrupted  only during  the 1960s. 
While the amplitude of fluctuations in the unemployment  rate has 
increased, it is also clear that the normal  level of unemployment  has 
risen. A conspicuous  feature  of the data  is that  the rate  for married  men 
has increased  in tandem  with the overall  rate. 
Table 1 presents information  on the unemployment  rate and the 
employment ratio (the ratio of  employed adults to the total adult 
population)  over the seven business cycles since 1953.  Again, a secular 
increase  in unemployment  is evident. With  the exception  of the boom of 
the 1960s  and the early 1970s,  each cycle has higher  peak, trough,  and 
average  unemployment  rates than  the one that preceded  it. Indeed, the 
unemployment  rate at the last peak, in July of 1981, was comparable 
with  the rates  reached  at most  previous  cyclical  troughs.  Unemployment 
at the next peak is not knowable. But most forecasts do not call for 
substantial declines. The most recent Congressional Budget Office 
forecast,  which  assumes  fairly  steady  growth  uninterrupted  by recession 
for the next five years, calls for unemployment  to decline only to 6.0 
percent  by 1991.2 
The secular increase in unemployment  contrasts sharply with the 
behavior  of the employment  ratio, which has trended  upwards  and is 
today close to its historical  peak. The rise reflects  the rapid  increase in 
the labor  force participation  of adult  women, from 37.6 percent  in 1960 
to 43.3 percent  in 1970,  51.3 percent  in 1980,  and 54.7 percent in 1985. 
Since 1973, both unemployment  and employment have grown quite 
rapidly.  Total employment  increased by 25 percent between 1973  and 
1985. 
Unemployment  can increase  for either  cyclical or structural  reasons. 
Before I turn to an analysis of changes in the structure  of the labor 
market,  it is necessary to address  the possibility that rising  unemploy- 
2.  Congressional  Budget  Office,  The Economic  and  Budget  Outlook: An  Update 
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ment  is merely  a by-product  of weakness in aggregate  demand  in recent 
years. A natural  way to test that possibility is to examine how the 
unemployment  rate has moved relative to other measures of cyclical 
conditions  and  to consider  whether  the relationship  between unemploy- 
ment  and  inflation  has changed. 
Table  2 examines  the trend  in unemployment  relative  to two cyclical 
indicators-vacancies and  capacity  utilization.  The results  indicate  that 
at any given level of vacancies or of capacity utilization,  both overall 
unemployment  and the unemployment  of middle-aged  men have in- 
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creased  sharply.3 Over  the  past  two decades  total  unemployment  appears 
to have increased  by between 0.13 and 0.17 percentage  point per year 
after adjustment  for changes in cyclical conditions. Similar  increases 
from a much lower base show up in the unemployment  rate of mature 
men.  Of  the roughly  3.5 percentage  point  increase  in  total  unemployment 
between its  1969 low point of 3.5 percent and the present rate, the 
equations indicate that between 2.5 and 2.9 percentage points are 
attributable  to structural  factors captured  by the time trend, with the 
relatively  small  remainder  being attributable  to changes  in the capacity 
utilization  and vacancies cyclical indicators. 
Estimation of Phillips curves for various periods does not yield 
sufficiently  precise estimates of the natural  rate of unemployment  to 
permit  definitive  statements  about  its evolution. But the data  do suggest 
that, particularly  when the mature  male  unemployment  rate is used, the 
natural  rate has increased. A calculation  is instructive. Between 1965 
Table 1.  Increasing Unemployment over the Business Cycle, July 1953-July  1986a 
Percent 
Peak  Trough  Average 
Employ-  Employ-  Employ- 
Unem-  ment-  Unem-  ment-  Unem-  ment- 
ployment  population  ployment  population  ployment  population 
Cycle (peak to peak)  rate  ratiob  rate  ratiob  rate  ratiob 
Jul. 1953-Jul.  1957  2.5  59.5  5.7  57.3  4.3  58.6 
Aug. 1957-Mar.  1960  4.0  58.7  7.2  56.9  5.7  57.5 
Apr. 1960-Nov. 1969  5.1  58.0  6.7  57.1  4.7  58.0 
Dec. 1969-Oct. 1973  3.4  59.8  5.7  58.4  5.2  58.5 
Nov. 1973-Dec. 1979  4.8  59.4  8.4  57.1  6.6  59.0 
Jan. 1980-June  1981  6.2  60.9  7.7  59.8  7.1  60.2 
Jul. 1981-Jul.  1986  7.1c  60.1c  10.6  58.2  8.2  60.0 
Source:  U.S.  Department of Labor,  Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Employment  and Earnings,  various issues. 
a.  Peak unemployment  is the rate at the beginning of the cycle.  Trough unemployment  is measured at the cyclical 
trough. The dating of the cycles  is based on National  Bureau of Economic  Research  chronology. 
b.  Employment  is  total civilian employment  as measured from the Current Population  Survey.  Population is the 
civilian noninstitutional population over  sixteen  years of age. 
c.  The cyclical  peak has not yet been observed  in this expansion. 
3. See James L. Medoff, "U.S.  Labor Markets:  Imbalance, Wage Growth, and 
Productivity  in the 1970s,"  BPEA,  1:1983,  pp. 87-120, for an earlier  treatment  of changes 
in the  relationship  between  unemployment  and  vacancies.  As Katharine  Abraham,  "What 
Does the Help-Wanted  Index Measure?" (Brookings, 1986), emphasizes, measuring 
vacancies  is not an easy problem.  The index used here is the Conference  Board Help- 
Wanted  Index adjusted  as suggested by Abraham  for changes in competition  in the 
newspaper  industry  and  the occupational  composition  of the labor  force. 344  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
and 1974,  the inflation  rate  as measured  using  the GNP  deflator  increased 
by 6.4 percentage points, while the unemployment  rate of men aged 
thirty-five  to forty-four  averaged  2.2 percent. Between 1980  and 1985, 
the inflation rate declined by 5.7 percentage points while the same 
unemployment  rate averaged  5.5 percent. If one assumes, in line with 
the data, that a reduction of 1 percentage point in the inflation  rate 
requires  1.5 percentage  point years of extra  unemployment,  the implied 
natural  rate is 3.2 percent for the earlier  period and 4.0 percent for the 
later one, an increase of one-fourth.  To the extent that supply shocks 
were partially  responsible for changes in the inflation  rate over both 
periods, the calculation  understates  the change  in the natural  rate. 
On balance, the evidence suggests that the current high level of 
unemployment,  particularly  the rate for mature  men, cannot easily be 
explained  as a consequence of a cyclical decline in demand.  I therefore 
turn  to an exploration  of structural  factors that could possibly account 
for rising  unemployment. 
CHANGES  IN  LABOR  FORCE  COMPOSITION 
One explanation  for increases in the unemployment  rate is that the 
composition  of the labor  force has changed  so that the share  of groups 
with high unemployment  rates has increased. In that case, measured 
Table 2.  Corrected Unemployment Trends, Various Periods,  1955-85a 
Percentage  points 
Unemployment  rate 
Males, 
Sample  aged 
period  Control  Total  35-44 
1955-85  Vacancy  rate  0.133  0.079 
(0.009)  (0.011) 
1967-85  Vacancy  rate  0.167  0.157 
(0.030)  (0.028) 
1967-85  Capacity utilization  0.147  0.159 
(0.025)  (0.020) 
Source:  Author's  calculations  based on data from BLS,  Employment  and Earnings,  various issues. 
a.  Regressions  of the unemployment  rate on a constant,  several controls,  and a time trend. The controls indicated 
are the contemporaneous  index (vacancy  rates or capacity  utilization) and the first two lags of the series.  Vacancy 
rates are derived from the Conference Board index of help-wanted advertisements  with adjustments made as suggested 
in Katharine Abraham,  "What Does  the  Help-Wanted  Index  Measure?"  (Brookings,  1986). Standard errors are in 
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unemployment  might increase even though the risk of unemployment 
for any particular  individual  with  given characteristics  had  not changed. 
It would also be true that any given level of unemployment  would 
indicate less labor market slack than had once been the case and so 
presumably  should  be a cause for less concern. 
George  Perry  put  forward  an argument  of this type in considering  the 
breakdown in the Phillips curve relation during the late 1960s.4  He 
suggested that the increasing share of workers from groups whose 
unemployment  was typically relatively high-women  and teenagers- 
had raised the level of measured  unemployment  corresponding  to any 
given amount of labor market slack. Perry constructed  an alternative 
unemployment  series by taking  a fixed weighted average  of the unem- 
ployment  rates of different  age-sex groups,  thus controlling  for changes 
in labor force composition. Since his introduction  of this notion, the 
construction of  "Perry weighted" unemployment  rates has become 
standard  in the  estimation  of Phillips  curves  and  in  discussions  of changes 
in the natural  rate  of unemployment.5 
There is no reason why the logic of adjusting  for changes in labor 
force composition should be applied only to changes in its age-sex 
composition.  Arguments  similar  to those originally  made by Perry  can 
be applied  to other  changes  in labor  force composition  as well. Some of 
the changes work in the opposite direction to Perry's demographic 
adjustment.  More  educated  workers  tend to have lower unemployment 
rates than do less educated workers, and the labor force has become 
more educated over the past thirty  years. Likewise, mining,  construc- 
tion, and manufacturing  tend to have higher average unemployment 
rates than do services, trade, and finance, and the share of the labor 
force engaged  in the latter  pursuits  has increased. Thus it is not clear a 
priori  that changes  in the composition  of the labor  force have tended to 
increase  measured  unemployment. 
Table  3 presents  estimates  of adjustments  to the measured  unemploy- 
ment rate for changes in labor composition by age and sex, marital 
4. See George L. Perry, "Changing  Labor Markets  and Inflation,"  BPEA, 3:1970, 
pp.  411-41. 
5. For calculations  of the natural  rate of unemployment  and potential  GNP that rely 
heavily  on demographically  adjusted  unemployment  rates, see Robert  J. Gordon,  "Infla- 
tion, Flexible  Exchange  Rates, and the Natural  Rate of Unemployment,"  in Martin  Neil 
Baily, ed.,  Workers, Jobs,  and Inflation (Brookings,  1982), pp. 89-152. 346  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
Table 3.  Changes in Labor Force Composition and the Unemployment Rate,  1954-85 
Percentage  points 
Unem- 
Adjustmenta 
ployment  Marital 
Year  rate  Age-sex  status  Schooling  Industry 
1954  5.5  -0.3  n.a.  n.a.  0.3 
1955  4.4  -0.2  0.3  n.a.  0.2 
1956  4.1  -0.2  0.3  n.a.  0.1 
1957  4.3  -0.2  -0.1  n.a.  0.1 
1958  6.8  -0.2  -0.1  n.a.  0.2 
1959  5.5  -0.2  0.0  0.4  0.2 
1960  5.5  -0.2  -0.1  n.a.  0.1 
1961  6.7  -0.2  0.0  n.a.  0.1 
1962  5.5  -0.2  -0.2  0.2  0.1 
1963  5.7  -0.1  -0.1  n.a.  0.1 
1964  5.2  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0 
1965  4.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1966  3.8  0.1  -0.1  0.0  -0.1 
1967  3.8  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
1968  3.6  0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.0 
1969  3.5  0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.0 
1970  4.9  0.2  0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
1971  5.9  0.3  0.0  -  0.3  -0.1 
1972  5.6  0.4  0.2  -  0.2  0.0 
1973  4.9  0.5  0.2  -0.2  0.0 
1974  5.6  0.5  0.3  -0.3  -0.1 
1975  8.5  0.7  0.4  -0.8  -0.3 
1976  7.7  0.7  0.5  -0.7  -0.2 
1977  7.1  0.7  0.6  -0.8  -0.1 
1978  6.1  0.7  0.6  -0.7  -0.1 
1979  5.8  0.6  0.5  -0.8  -0.1 
1980  7.1  0.6  0.5  -  1.1  -0.2 
1981  7.6  0.6  0.7  -  1.4  -0.1 
1982  9.7  0.6  0.7  -  1.8  -0.4 
1983  9.6  0.4  0.7  -  2.3  -0.3 
1984  7.5  0.3  0.6  -  2.1  -0.2 
1985  7.2  0.3  0.6  -2.1  -0.1 
Source: Author's calculations.  Actual unemployment  rate and data before  1984 used in calculations  of adjustments 
are from BLS,  Handbook  of Labor Statistics,  Bulletin 2217 (June 1985). Unemployment  rates by demographic group 
are listed  in table 27, pp. 69-73;  rates by marital status are in table 50, pp.  115-18;  rates by education  are in table 
62, p.  169; rates by industry are in table 30, p. 77. Weights for demographic civilian labor force  status are from table 
4,  pp.  14-17;  weights  for marital status  are from table 6,  pp.  22-23;  weights  for educational  attainment  are from 
table 61,  p.  164; weights  for industrial composition  are from table 30,  p.  76.  Statistics  for  1984 and  1985 are from 
BLS,  Employment  and Earnings,  vol.  33 (January 1986). 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  The adjustment for each  year is calculated  by creating an adjusted unemployment  rate using  1965 labor force 
shares as weights.  (See equation 1 in text.) The adjustment for changing labor force composition  is then the difference 
between  the actual and the adjusted unemployment  rate. Lawrence H. Summers  347 
status, schooling,  and  primary  industry.  The adjustment  for each year  is 
calculated  by first creating  an adjusted  unemployment  rate as a fixed 
weighted  average  of group-specific  unemployment  rates  using 1965  labor 
force shares  as weights. That  is, 
(1)  A URt =  E si65  URit. 
The adjusted  unemployment  rate, A UR, is the unemployment  rate that 
would  prevail  in a given year  if each labor  force group  had  its 1965  share, 
Si65, of the labor  force. The adjustment  for changing  labor  force compo- 
sition is then the difference  between the actual and the adjusted  unem- 
ployment  rate. 
While it would be ideal to estimate the adjustment  using a single 
decomposition  of the labor  force into subgroups,  it is not possible to do 
so with the available  data. The table therefore  presents four separate 
adjustments.  The age-sex adjustment  is based on a decomposition  of the 
labor force into the fourteen categories used by Perry.6  The marital 
status adjustment  divides the labor  force into six categories-men  and 
women who are single, married  with spouse present, and widowed, 
separated,  or divorced.  The schooling  adjustment  is based on a division 
of the labor  force into six categories  ranging  from  workers  with  less than 
five  years  of schooling  to those completing  four  or  more  years  of college.7 
Finally, the industry adjustment  is based on a decomposition of the 
experienced  labor force into categories corresponding  to the one-digit 
standard  industrial  classification  (SIC)  code.8 
The changing  age-sex composition  of the labor  force can account  for 
relatively  little of the increase in unemployment  in recent years. The 
adjustment  (relative  to 1965)  peaked  at 0.7 percentage  point in the mid- 
1970s  and has declined since then to only 0.3 point in 1985.  The decline 
in the adjustment  reflects two developments:  the decline in the labor 
force share of teenagers  and the declining  relative unemployment  rate 
of women. The labor  force share  of teenagers  has  fallen  from  7.9 percent 
6. The  categories  are  men  and  women  aged  sixteen  to nineteen,  twenty  to twenty-four, 
twenty-five  to thirty-four,  thirty-five  to forty-four,  forty-five  to fifty-four,  fifty-five  to sixty- 
four,  and  sixty-five  and  over. 
7. The schooling  adjustment  is calculated  using  data  for March  of each year  because 
questions  on educational  attainment  are  asked  only in the March  CPS. 
8. The  industry  adjustment  is not strictly  parallel  to the others  since  it is an adjustment 
to the unemployment  rate of experienced  workers.  This noncomparability  is inevitable 
given  that  new entrants  to the labor  force cannot  meaningfully  be assigned  an industry. 348  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
in 1965  to 6.8 percent  in 1985,  a decline that  is assumed  here to have no 
effect on the youth unemployment  rate. If, as Michael Wachter has 
argued, crowding  effects cause increases in the youth unemployment 
rate, the decline  in the adjustment  in recent years  would  be significantly 
greater.9 
The dramatic  change in the composition  of the labor  force in recent 
years has been the increase in female labor force participation. If 
unemployment  rates for men and women had maintained  the pattern 
they exhibited in the 1960s, the measured  unemployment  rate would 
have increased  substantially.  But, as I discuss later,  the gap  between the 
unemployment  rates of men and women has narrowed  in recent years, 
so the effect is not very large. 
More  important  than  the age-sex adjustment  is the adjustment  for the 
changing  marital  status  of the labor  force. It rose to 0.6 percentage  point 
in the mid-1970s  but, unlike  the age-sex adjustment,  has  not turned  down 
since. The major  marital  status  change  is the drop  in the fraction  of men 
in the labor  force who are married.  In 1965, 18  percent  of the male labor 
force had never been married,  compared  with 27 percent  in 1985.  Given 
that unemployment  rates were three times as high for single as for 
married  men in 1985, the effect of reductions  in the share of the labor 
force that  is married  is quite substantial.  10 
Quantitatively,  the most important  adjustment  for changes in the 
composition  of the labor  force involves education.  Assuming  no changes 
in group-specific  unemployment  rates, recent increases in education 
should have reduced  the unemployment  rate by 2.1 percentage  points 
between 1965  and 1985. That adjustment  dwarfs  the demographic  and 
marital  status corrections.  11 Over  the past twenty years the share  of the 
labor  force that received some college education  nearly  doubled, from 
22  to 40  percent,  while  the share  with  less than  an eighth-grade  education 
fell from  23 percent  to only 7 percent. 
9.  See Michael  L. Wachter, "Intermediate  Swings in Labor-Force  Participation," 
BPEA,  2:1977,  pp. 545-74. Wachter  forecast,  on the basis  of demographic  considerations, 
a significant  decline  in the natural  rate  of unemployment  in the early 1980s. 
10. The adjustment  is not independent  of the previous  adjustment  for changes  in the 
age-sex  composition  of the labor  force. It also reflects  increases  in the share  of women  in 
the labor  force and  to some extent reflects  changes  in the age structure  of the labor  force. 
The rise in the proportion  of single  men  noted  in the text is particularly  striking  in light  of 
the decline  in the share  of teenagers  and  young  men  in the labor  force. 
11. Robert  M. Solow made  this point  in "Macro-policy  and  Full  Employment,"  in Eli 
Ginzberg,  ed., Jobs  for Americans  (Prentice  Hall, 1976),  pp. 46-48. Lawrence H. Summers  349 
It is arguable  that the educational  adjustment  made here is inappro- 
priate because the differentials  in unemployment  between different 
educational  groups  reflect  not the effects of education  but rather  differ- 
ences in the innate skills of more and less educated  workers. Undoubt- 
edly, the adjustment  calculated  here  is an overestimate  of the true  effect 
of increased  educational  attainment  on unemployment  for this reason, 
but the overestimate  may not be large.  The premise  of policies directed 
at discouraging  teenagers  from  dropping  out of high  school is that  more 
schooling means less unemployment.  And the fact that the relative 
unemployment  rate of college graduates  has dropped  as their number 
has swelled casts doubt  on the importance  of sorting  effects of the type 
noted above. 
Finally,  the industry  adjustment  shown  in the final  column  of the table 
indicates that changes in the industrial  mix, particularly  the decline in 
the share of employment  in the volatile manufacturing  sector, has also 
worked  to reduce  unemployment.  In some recent  years, when manufac- 
turing  has been weak because of adverse  cyclical conditions,  the adjust- 
ment has been quantitatively  significant,  reaching  0.4 percentage  point 
in 1982. 
While it is inappropriate  to sum the various adjustments  in table 3 
because they are  not independent,  it seems clear  that  mix effects cannot 
account for the recent increase in unemployment.  The mix effects that 
should have led to decreases in unemployment,  increases in education 
and reductions  in manufacturing  employment  are quantitatively  much 
more important  than the demographic  mix effects that are emphasized 
in most discussions of rising unemployment.  Taking  into account the 
changing  composition  of the labor  force does not reduce and may even 
increase  the size of the rise in unemployment  that  must  be explained. 
WHOSE  UNEMPLOYMENT  HAS  INCREASED? 
Since  changes  in  labor  force  composition  cannot  account  for  increases 
in employment,  it is natural  to ask how the increase  in unemployment  in 
recent  years  has  been distributed  across  the population.  Table  4 presents 
unemployment  rates for various subgroups  of the population  in 1965, 
1974,  1978,  and 1985.  The years 1965,  1974,  and 1978  are  contrasted  with 
1985  because each is a year  of moderately  low but  not cyclically  minimal 
unemployment.  The broad  conclusions  that  emerge  in the discussion  are 
not sensitive  to the choice of years. 350  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
Table 4.  Unemployment Rates for Population Subgroups, 1965, 1974, 1978, and 1985 
Percent 
Category  1965  1974  1978  1985 
Total  4.5  5.6  6.1  7.2 
Age-sex 
Males,  16-19  14.1  15.6  15.8  19.5 
Males, 20-24  6.4  8.8  9.2  11.4 
Males, 25-34  2.9  4.0  4.4  6.6 
Males, 35-44  2.5  2.6  2.8  4.9 
Males, 45-54  2.5  2.4  2.7  4.6 
Males, 55-64  3.3  2.6  2.8  4.3 
Males, 65 and over  3.5  3.3  4.2  3.1 
All males  4.0  4.9  5.3  7.0 
Females, 16-19  15.7  16.6  17.1  17.6 
Females, 20-24  7.3  9.5  10.1  10.7 
Females, 25-34  5.5  6.2  6.7  7.4 
Females,  35-44  4.6  4.6  5.0  5.5 
Females, 45-54  3.2  3.7  4.0  4.8 
Females, 55-64  2.8  3.2  3.2  4.3 
Females, 65 and over  2.9  3.6  3.8  3.3 
All females  5.5  6.7  7.2  7.4 
Marital status 
Single men  10.1  11.8  11.7  12.7 
Married  men  2.4  2.7  2.8  4.3 
Divorced, separated, 
or widowed men  7.2  6.2  6.6  9.2 
Single women  8.2  10.5  10.9  10.7 
Married women  4.5  5.3  5.5  5.6 
Divorced, separated, 
or widowed  women  5.4  6.3  6.9  8.3 
Educationa 
Less than five years  7.1  4.8  7.7  11.3 
Five to eight years  5.6  6.2  8.5  13.0 
One to three years of 
high school  7.4  9.6  12.4  15.9 
Four years of high 
school  4.1  4.8  6.2  8.0 
One to three years 
of college  3.3  4.2  4.6  5.1 
Four or more years 
of college  1.4  2.0  2.5  2.6 
Sources:  BLS,  Handbook  of Labor Statistics  (June 1985). Unemployment  rates by age-sex  are from table 27, pp. 
69-73;  by marital status, from table 50, pp.  115-18; and by education,  from table 62, p.  169. Data for 1985 are taken 
from Employment and Earnings,  vol.  33 (January 1986). 
a.  Education  statistics  for 1985 were obtained by telephone  from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Lawrence H. Summers  351 
The most  dramatic  relative  increases  in unemployment  have  occurred 
among  prime-aged  males. While  aggregate  unemployment  increased  by 
18  percent,  from  6.1 percent  to 7.2 percent, between 1978  and 1985,  the 
unemployment  rate for men aged thirty-five  to forty-four  increased  by 
75 percent, from 2.8 percent to 4.9 percent. The increase occurred 
despite a rise in that cohort's labor  force nonparticipation  rate  from 4.3 
to 5.0 percent.  A similar  but  less pronounced  increase  in unemployment 
is observed for men in the other under-sixty-five  age groups. It is 
noteworthy that even going as far back as 1965, the conclusion that 
unemployment  among  mature  men  has risen  disproportionately  remains 
valid. 
Unemployment  rates for women have risen relatively little, despite 
huge  increases  in labor  force participation  rates. For women  aged  thirty- 
five to forty-four, the unemployment  rate increased only 10 percent, 
from 5.0 to 5.5 percent, during 1978-85. The relative increases in 
unemployment  were somewhat smaller  for younger  women and some- 
what  greater  for older  women. There  is a substantial  difference  between 
the experience  of young  men and  that  of young  women. While  increases 
in the unemployment  of women aged sixteen to nineteen  and twenty to 
twenty-four have been relatively small since 1974, there have been 
significant  increases in the unemployment  rate of young men, particu- 
larly  those aged sixteen to nineteen. 
The total unemployment  rate is a weighted  average  of the unemploy- 
ment rates of different  demographic  groups  with weights depending  on 
their  shares  of the labor  force. A simple  way of combining  the effects of 
changing  demographic  composition  and changing  group-specific  unem- 
ployment  rates  is to ask what  contribution  different  demographic  groups 
make to total unemployment  in different  years. The contribution  of a 
given  group  to total  unemployment  is the product  of its labor  force share 
and its unemployment  rate. Performing  this calculation reveals two 
significant  developments.  First, the amount  of unemployment  attribut- 
able to teenagers has declined in recent years. Teenagers contributed 
1.2  percentage  points to the 4.5 percent  unemployment  rate in 1965, 1.5 
points to the 5.6 percent unemployment  rate in 1974, 1.5 points to the 
6.1 percent unemployment  rate in 1978, but only 1.3 points to the 7.2 
percent  unemployment  rate in 1985.  Second, the bulk  of the increase  in 
unemployment  in recent years is attributable  to men aged twenty and 
above, whose contribution  to total unemployment  increased from 1.9 
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Data  on unemployment  rates  for different  marital  status  groups  reveal 
that  unemployment  has increased  most dramatically  among  married  and 
formerly  married  men. The rate  for these groups  increased  by about 50 
percent between 1978 and 1985. For single men and women and for 
married  women the data  reveal only very minor  increases  in unemploy- 
ment since  1974. These patterns cast doubt on the arguments that 
increases  in measured  unemployment  are  primarily  the result  of a rise in 
the fraction  of the population  on the margin  between working  and not 
working.'2  Surely mature  men, especially those who are married,  are 
the group  for whom it is least plausible  that social changes have made 
marginal  labor  force attachment  attractive. 
Finally, the breakdown  of unemployment  rates by education  in table 
4 reveals that the extent of the increase in unemployment  over the past 
decade declines steadily  with increased  education.  The unemployment 
rate  of high  school drop-outs  increased  by more  than  one-fourth  between 
1978  and 1985,  compared  with an increase of only 4 percent  for college 
graduates  and 11  percent  for workers  with some college education.  The 
unemployment  rate for those with only one to five years of schooling 
rose by almost  50 percent. The level of unemployment  is not, however, 
monotonically related to education either in the 1970s or at present. 
People receiving  no high school training  have significantly  lower unem- 
ployment rates than do high school drop-outs.'3  That pattern at least 
raises a question  about  arguments  that  unemployment  is due to a lack of 
skills on the part  of workers. 
WHAT  TYPES  OF  UNEMPLOYMENT  HAVE  INCREASED? 
The discussion so far suggests that the increase in measured  unem- 
ployment is potentially  a serious social problem. Further  evidence to 
that effect can be gleaned from data on changes in the composition  of 
unemployment  by reason and duration.  As table 5 suggests, most of the 
increase in unemployment  over the last decade is concentrated  among 
12. For the clearest and most persuasive statement  of this view see Robert Hall's 
comment  on Medoff, "U.S. Labor  Markets,  " BPEA, 1:1983,  pp. 121-23. I consider  the 
argument  in more  detail  later. 
13. Age effects may  be at work  here. It is likely  that  high  school drop-outs  in the labor 
force  are  on average  much  younger  than  people  receiving  less than  eight  years  of schooling. 
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job losers. The unemployment  rate  attributable  to  job loss rose from 1.6 
percent  in 1967  to 2.4 percent  in 1974,2.5  percent  in 1978,  and  3.6 percent 
in 1985.  Unemployment  attributable  to job leavers has not increased  at 
all since 1974, while unemployment  among new entrants  to the work 
force has increased modestly. Noticeable increases in unemployment 
have also taken place among workers reentering  the work force. For 
reasons  spelled  out in detail  in my earlier  paper  with  Kim  Clark,  I believe 
that  a substantial  part  of the reentrant  category  is composed  of workers 
who  have  recently  lostjobs.  14 If even a portion  of the  increase  in  reentrant 
unemployment  is added  to the  job losers category, it appears  clear that 
Table 5.  Unemployment by Reason and Duration, Various Years,  1965-85 
Percent except  where otherwise  indicated 
Unem-  Reason for  unemployment 
ployment  Re-  New 
Year  rate  Job losers  Job  leavers  entrants  entrants 
1967a  3.8  1.6  0.5  1.2  0.5 
1974  5.6  2.4  0.8  1.6  0.7 
1978  6.1  2.5  0.8  1.8  0.9 
1985  7.2  3.6  0.8  2.0  0.9 
Duration  of unemployment  Share of 
Unem-  27 or  Mean  long-term 
ployment  0-5  6-14  15-26  more  duration  unem- 
Year  rate  weeks  weeks  weeks  weeks  (weeks)b  ploymentc 
1965  4.5  2.2  1.3  0.5  0.5  11.8  42.5 
1974  5.6  2.8  1.7  0.6  0.4  9.8  45.2 
1978  6.1  2.8  1.9  0.8  0.6  11.9  46.0 
1985  7.2  3.0  2.2  0.9  1.1  15.6  54.Od 
Sources:  BLS,  Handbook  of Labor Statistics  (June 1985). Unemployment  by reason for unemployment  is in table 
32,  pp.  80-81.  Unemployment  by duration of  unemployment  is in table 31, pp. 78-79.  Statistics  for  1985 are from 
Employment and Earnings,  vol.  33 (January 1986), table  12, p.  166, and table  14, p.  167. 
a.  Data on reason for unemployment  do not begin until 1967. 
b.  Mean duration of interrupted spells. 
c.  Fraction of the year's  unemployment  due to persons  with more than twenty-seven  weeks  of unemployment  as 
derived from the Work Experience  Survey. 
d.  Because  1985 data are unavailable,  data from  1984 are used. 
14. Kim  B. Clark  and  Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Labor  Market  Dynamics  and Unem- 
ployment:  A Reconsideration,"  BPEA,  1:1979,  pp. 13-60. We show that  many  reentrants 
have  relatively  recent  work  experience  and  report  durations  of unemployment  very close 
to the total  time since they last worked.  The traditional  picture  of housewives  reentering 
the labor  force after their children  have grown  up is grossly inconsistent  with the facts 
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the bulk  of the increase  in unemployment  in recent years is the result  of 
job loss. 
The data also suggest that a large part of the observed increase in 
unemployment  is due to increases  in the duration  of unemployment.  Of 
the 1.1 percentage point increase in the unemployment  rate between 
1978  and 1985, 0.5 point, or almost half, is attributable  to increases in 
the number  of people reporting  themselves as out of work  for more  than 
twenty-seven weeks. The incidence of such long-term  unemployment 
has more than doubled since 1965. Only a relatively small part of the 
observed  increase  in unemployment  is due to an increase  in the number 
of people  reporting  themselves  as unemployed  for  fewer  than  five  weeks. 
Data on unemployment  duration  are difficult  to interpret  because of 
the high incidence of reporting  errors. It appears that almost three- 
quarters  of the unemployed  population  report  their duration  of unem- 
ployment inconsistently from month to  month.15 There is  also the 
complication, emphasized by many authors, that almost half of all 
unemployment  spells end in withdrawal  from  the labor  force rather  than 
in employment.'6  Nonetheless, the available  information  suggests that 
unemployment  is increasingly  concentrated  among a relatively small 
group  that  is unemployed  for long stretches  of time. 
An easy way to see this point is to note that doubling the mean 
duration of incomplete spells of unemployment (shown in table 5) 
provides an estimate of the mean duration  of the completed spell for 
those currently  unemployed.  17 As Clark  and  I argued  in our  earlier  paper, 
this concept  is far  superior  to the more  commonly  studied  mean  duration 
of a completed spell for those entering  unemployment  in assessing the 
dynamics  of unemployment.  The expected total duration  of unemploy- 
15. The consistency  of individuals'  reported  unemployment  duration  from month  to 
month  is examined  in James  M. Poterba  and  Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Response  Variation 
in the CPS: Caveats  for the Unemployment  Analyst," Monthly  Labor  Review, vol. 107 
(March  1984),  pp. 37-43. 
16. This finding  is probably  a consequence  of measurement  error  in the CPS survey. 
See James  M. Poterba  and  Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Reporting  Errors  and  Labor  Market 
Dynamics,"  Econometrica  (forthcoming). 
17. For discussions of alternative  concepts of the duration  of unemployment,  see 
Stephen  W. Salant, "Search  Theory  and Duration  Data:  A Theory  of Sorts," Quarterly 
Journal  of Economics,  vol. 91 (February  1977),  pp. 39-57; George  A. Akerlof  and Brian 
G. M. Main, "Unemployment  Spells and Unemployment  Experience,"  American  Eco- 
nomic  Review, vol. 70 (December  1980),  pp. 885-93; and Clark  and Summers,  "Labor 
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ment for the unemployed is now thirty-one weeks,  compared with 
twenty-four  weeks in 1978,  twenty  weeks in 1974,  and  twenty-four  weeks 
in 1965.  Taking  account  in some way of the shortening  of reported  spells 
of unemployment  that  can be attributed  to labor  force withdrawal  would 
further  increase  the estimated  duration  of joblessness for the currently 
unemployed  population. 
Additional  evidence on the concentration  of unemployment  among 
the long-term  unemployed  is provided  by the retrospective  Work Ex- 
perience Survey conducted annually  in March  as a supplement  to the 
CPS. The March survey, in which respondents are asked about the 
extent of their unemployment  and employment  experience in the pre- 
ceding year, makes it possible to calculate the fraction  of total unem- 
ployment  attributable  to people experiencing  different  amounts  of un- 
employment  in the preceding  year. In our  earlier  paper,  Clark  and  I used 
this data  to suggest  that  a large  fraction  of unemployment  in 1969, 1974, 
and 1975  was attributable  to the relatively small subgroup  of the popu- 
lation that experienced  more than six months of unemployment  in the 
preceding year.18 Replicating our calculations for subsequent years 
suggests  that  the importance  of long-term  unemployment  has increased 
significantly.  While  people out of work  for twenty-seven  or more  weeks 
accounted for 45.2 percent of all unemployment  reported  in the 1974 
Work  Experience  Survey,  they accounted  for 46.0 percent  of unemploy- 
ment  in 1978  and  54.0 percent  of unemployment  in 1984,  the most recent 
year  for which data  are available. 
Increases in normal  unemployment  over the past twenty years rep- 
resent a  serious problem. The view that the current high level  of 
unemployment  is primarily  the result  of the increased  unemployment  of 
secondary  workers  is simply  false. In fact, the increases in unemploy- 
ment have been relatively greatest for mature men with dependents. 
And  they have resulted  primarily  fromjob  loss and  increases  in duration 
of unemployment. 
CPS  UNEMPLOYMENT  AND  OTHER  LABOR  MARKET  INDICATORS 
A number  of recent analyses have called attention  to the fact that  the 
observed  increase in the official  unemployment  rate has not coincided 
18. Clark  and  Summers,  "Labor  Market  Dynamics,"  table  4, pp. 36-37. 356  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
with substantial  increases  in other  labor  market  indicators.  '9 It could be 
that some flaw in the CPS measure  of unemployment  accounts for the 
observed increase, though such an argument  is difficult  to evaluate. 
Unemployment  as reflected  in the CPS is more a state of mind  than an 
objective  reality.  The substantial  importance  of rotation  group  bias and 
the sensitivity  of the measured  unemployment  rate  to even small  changes 
in the  phrasing  or  the order  of the questions  asked  suggests  the subjective 
nature  of measured  unemployment.20  This means that it is difficult  to 
examine  whether  or not the CPS  is correctly  measuring  unemployment. 
In an important  sense, unemployment  is what  the CPS says it is. 
Nonetheless, it is useful  to contrast  movements  in CPS  unemployment 
rates  with  movements  in other  variables  that  are  likely  to reflect  changes 
in labor market conditions. Table 6 presents estimates of the CPS 
unemployment  rate, the insured  unemployment  rate,  the unemployment 
rate  as inferred  from  the annual  retrospective  Work  Experience  Survey, 
and the discouraged  worker  rate.2"  A major  mystery  is the sharp  recent 
decline in the ratio of insured unemployment  to total unemployment. 
The  insured  unemployment  rate-the  number  of recipients  of unemploy- 
ment  benefits  divided  by the number  of jobs covered by unemployment 
insurance-was  about 15 percent lower in 1985  than it was in 1978  and 
20  percent  lower  in 1985  than  it was in 1974.  It was only one-third  greater 
than  it was in 1969.  As Gary  Burtless  explains,  one would  expect insured 
unemployment  to be below actual unemployment  since many of the 
unemployed  are ineligible  for benefits.22  Burtless also suggests that the 
increasing  share  of the population  covered by unemployment  insurance 
can account for some of the pre-1980  trend decrease in the ratio of 
19. See, for example,  Martin  Neil Baily, "Labor  Market  Performance,  Competition, 
and Inflation," in Baily, ed.,  Workers, Jobs,  and Inflation, pp. 15-44;  Hall's comment on 
Medoff, "U.S.  Labor Markets";  Gary Burtless, "Why is Insured  Unemployment  So 
Low?," BPEA, 1:1983,  pp. 225-49; and  George  A. Akerlof  and  Janet  L. Yellen, "Unem- 
ployment through  the Filter of Memory," Quarterly  Journal of Economics, vol.  100 
(August  1985),  pp. 747-73. 
20. For a discussion  of these points  stressing  the ambiguity  inherent  in the distinction 
between being unemployed  and not being in the labor  force, see Clark  and Summers, 
"Labor  Market  Dynamics." 
21. It would  be desirable  to examine  the  quit  and  lay-off  rates  in conjunction  with  other 
labor  market  indicators.  Unfortunately,  publication  of these turnover  data  was discontin- 
ued after 1981.  As Baily, "Labor  Markets,"  argued,  their  behavior  up until 1981  does not 
mirror  that  of the official  unemployment  rate. 
22. Burtless,  "Insured  Unemployment." Lawrence H. Summers  357 
insured  unemployment  to total unemployment.  But there  is no apparent 
explanation  for the divergence  of these two measures  in recent years. 
The mystery  is deepened  by the observation,  noted above, that most of 
the recent increase in unemployment  has been due to increases in the 
job loser  category,  the  category  most  eligible  for  unemployment  benefits. 
Burtless considers a number  of possible explanations  for the recent 




Survey  Insured 
Unemployment  unemployment  unemployment  Discouraged 
Year  rate  ratea  rate  worker rate 
1960  5.5  6.0  4.8  n.a. 
1961  6.7  6.6  5.6  n.a. 
1962  5.5  6.2  4.4  n.a. 
1963  5.7  5.7  4.3  n.a. 
1964  5.2  5.2  3.8  n.a. 
1965  4.5  3.9  3.0  n.a. 
1966  3.8  3.2  2.3  n.a. 
1967  3.8  3.1  2.5  n.a. 
1968  3.6  2.9  2.2  0.9 
1969  3.5  3.0  2.1  0.7 
1970  4.9  4.7  3.4  0.8 
1971  5.9  5.6  4.1  0.9 
1972  5.6  5.1  3.5  0.9 
1973  4.9  4.2  2.7  0.8 
1974  5.6  5.3  3.5  0.8 
1975  8.5  8.0  6.0  1.2 
1976  7.7  7.3  4.6  1.0 
1977  7.1  6.4  3.9  1.0 
1978  6.1  5.3  3.3  0.8 
1979  5.8  5.0  2.9  0.7 
1980  7.1  6.8  3.1  0.9 
1981  7.6  7.4  3.5  1.0 
1982  9.7  9.4  4.6  1.4 
1983  9.6  8.4  3.8  1.5 
1984  7.5  6.9  2.8  1.1 
1985  7.2  n.a.  2.8  1.0 
Source:  Author's  calculations  and BLS,  Handbook  of Labor  Statistics  (June  1985). Data  for  1984 and  1985 are 
from Employment and Earnings,  vol.  33 (January 1986). 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Calculated from published tabulations as the ratio of total weeks  of unemployment  to labor force time. 358  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
low level of the insured  unemployment  rate  without  finding  any that are 
wholly persuasive. It appears that many people who, based on their 
answers to the CPS questionnaire,  appear  to be eligible  for unemploy- 
ment insurance  are not collecting  it, possibly because benefits  began  to 
be taxed in 1980 or, more plausibly, because administrative  changes 
have increased  the logistical  difficulties  associated with collecting ben- 
efits. It is conceivable  that  receipt  of benefits  carries  more stigma  in the 
Reagan  era than  it once did. Perhaps  the most plausible  explanation,  in 
view of the increasing  average  duration  of unemployment,  is that many 
of the unemployed  have exhausted their unemployment  insurance  eli- 
gibility  during  either  their  current  unemployment  spell  or a previous  one. 
Although  it is not clear  what  the low insured  unemployment  rate  means, 
at a minimum  it exonerates unemployment  insurance  as a cause of the 
high level of unemployment.  If a smaller share of the labor force is 
collecting benefits than used to be the case, unemployment  insurance 
can hardly  be blamed  for increasing  unemployment. 
The second  column  of table  6 follows George  Akerlof  and  Janet  Yellen 
in  reporting  the  Work  Experience  Survey  unemployment  rate,  calculated 
as the ratio  of reported  unemployment  for  the preceding  year  to reported 
labor  force participation,  defined  as the sum  of time spent  employed  and 
unemployed.23  As they note, using data for the 1960-81 period, there 
has been a tendency  for the retrospective  unemployment  rate  to decline 
relative  to the official  rate  over time. Between 1974  and 1984,  the Work 
Experience Survey unemployment  rate increased by  1.6 points; the 
official  rate, 1.9 points. 
Akerlof  and Yellen estimate that the CPS unemployment  rate corre- 
sponding  to any given Work Experience Survey unemployment  rate 
rose by about  0.8 percent  per year through  1981,  a relationship  that has 
held  up  over the three  additional  years  for which  data  have since become 
available.24  The CPS rate has thus risen by about 12 percent, or 1 
23. My calculation  differs  slightly  from  that of Akerlof  and  Yellen, "Unemployment 
through  the Filter  of Memory,"  because  I use reported  labor  force participation  from  the 
Work  Experience  Survey  as the denominator  in calculating  the Work  Experience  Survey 
unemployment  rate rather  than using labor force data from the CPS as they did. My 
procedure  reduces  somewhat  the differential  between  the two series. 
24. The precise  estimate  depends  on what adjustment  is made  for the changes  in the 
CPS  instituted  in 1967  after  the Gordon  Commission  report.  See President's  Commission 
to Appraise  Employment  and Unemployment  Statistics, Measuring  Employment  and 
Unemployment (GPO,  1962). Lawrence H. Summers  359 
percentage  point,  relative  to the retrospectively  reported  unemployment 
rate over the past fifteen  years. Akerlof  and Yellen find, however, that 
there has been essentially no trend  increase in the ratio of CPS unem- 
ployment to retrospective  unemployment  for either prime-age  men or 
prime-age  women over this period. They also report that about one- 
fourth of the movement in official unemployment  relative to Work 
Experience Survey unemployment  can be explained  by changes in the 
composition of the labor force, particularly  the influx of women, for 
whom  the ratio  of retrospective  unemployment  to official  unemployment 
is particularly  low. 
Citing a variety of psychological studies suggesting that the more 
painful an experience the better people recall it, Akerlof and Yellen 
attribute  the rising  differential  between  the two rates  to a decrease  in the 
discomfort  associated  with unemployment.  They buttress  their  claim  by 
noting that the ratio of retrospective unemployment  to official unem- 
ployment is highest for mature  men and that it rises in recessions. A 
natural  interpretation  of the Work Experience Survey information  is 
that  unemployment  has become a less painful  and salient  experience  for 
young  workers.  It might  be more  accurate  to say that  the unemployment 
of young workers has become less salient for their parents, since one 
member  of a household, typically  an adult,  provides  information  on the 
labor  market  status of all household members  in the Work  Experience 
Survey, as in the CPS. The reduction  in the salience of unemployment 
is not surprising  given the sharp  increase  in the share  of young  people in 
school. It seems reasonable to conclude from the Work Experience 
Survey  data  that  a 7 percent  unemployment  rate  today  is associated  with 
less distress than  was once the case. But the data shed little light  on the 
observed increase in unemployment, most of which has come from 
adults. 
The  final  column  of the table  presents  the "discouraged  worker"  rate, 
estimated as the number  of discouraged  workers divided by the total 
labor  force. Discouraged  workers  are defined  as those who cite inability 
to find  work as their sole reason  for not searching.  Many  analysts have 
argued that they should properly be  counted as unemployed. The 
discouraged  worker  rate has moved in parallel  with the official unem- 
ployment  rate over the past fifteen years. If, as some have argued, an 
increasing  percentage of unemployment  reflects marginal  labor force 
attachment,  one might have expected to see a decline in the ratio of 360  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
discouraged  workers  to unemployed  persons. The observed  increase  in 
discouragement  over the past decade suggests that increases in unem- 
ployment  do in fact reflect  increases  in the difficulty  ofjob finding. 
Different  labor market  indicators  capture  different  aspects of labor 
market  performance.  It does not appear  that other labor  market  indica- 
tors provide a basis for concluding  that the observed increase in CPS 
unemployment  reflects measurement  error. However, they do suggest 
that  the nature  of unemployment  may  have changed  over the past fifteen 
years. 
THE  SEARCH  ACTIVITIES  OF  THE  UNEMPLOYED 
Oversimplifying  slightly, people are counted as unemployed  if they 
report  being available  for work in the Current  Population  Survey week 
and report having looked for work in the preceding four weeks. In 
practice,  the first  question  regarding  availability  for work  is the principal 
determinant  of unemployment  status. All survey respondents  are asked 
their primary  activity. Five answers are possible for the unemployed: 
with a job (to which they expect to return),  looking for work, keeping 
house, in school, and  other. The last category  includes  but is not limited 
to retired  workers. If increasing  unemployment  reflects an increase in 
the number  of people marginally  attached  to the labor  force, the number 
reporting  their  primary  activity  as looking  for  work  should  have  declined. 
The intensity  of their  search  should  also have declined. 
While data on the primary  activity of the unemployed  are not pub- 
lished, I was able to construct a time series on primary  activity using 
raw data  from  the CPS for May of each year from 1973  through  1984.  A 
conspicuous  feature  of the data  reported  in table  7 is that  only a minority 
of the unemployed  report themselves as having a job or report their 
primary  activity as looking for work.25  The fraction reporting their 
primary  activity as looking for work or as having a job to which they 
expect to return  varies cyclically but shows no trend during 1973-84. 
The data  reveal significant  declines in the proportion  of the unemployed 
reporting  their primary  activity as keeping house or being in school, a 
finding  that is supported  by the observation  that the average  number  of 
search  methods  used by unemployed  persons has gradually  increased. 
25. See Hall's comment  on Medoff, "U.S. Labor  Markets";  and Hall, "The Nature 
and  Measurement  of Unemployment,"  Working  Paper  252  (National  Bureau  of Economic 
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The  mystery  in table  7 is the dramatic  increase  in the number  of people 
listing  "other" as their  primary  activity. While "other" includes  retire- 
ment, it is implausible  that the large increase in the category could be 
accounted for by increasing  retirement.26  As shown in table 8, which 
presents an age-sex breakdown  on the primary  activity of the unem- 
ployed for 1974 and 1984, increases in the "other" category are not 
confined to  older workers for whom the retirement explanation is 
plausible.  The fraction  of men aged twenty-five  to thirty-four  reporting 
"other"  as their  primary  activity rose from  21.3 percent  to 35.3 percent 
between 1974  and 1984.  Perhaps  more  important,  the table  reveals large 
demographic  differences  in the nature  of the changes  in primary  activity. 
There appear to be quite substantial  declines in the number of men 
looking  for work  except for the cohort  aged  twenty to twenty-four,  while 
the number  of women looking for work has increased slightly. More 
detailed tabulations  suggest that the declines in the fraction of those 
Table 7.  Major Activity of the Unemployed, 1973-84 




With a  Looking  Keeping  In  Other  methods 
Year  job  for  work  house  school  activitiesa  used 
1973  6.8  34.3  27.3  18.0  13.5  1.52 
1974  6.5  35.7  25.5  17.7  14.7  1.54 
1975  12.1  38.3  23.2  13.2  13.2  1.58 
1976  6.1  38.4  23.4  15.4  16.7  1.58 
1977  4.8  36.7  25.2  16.3  16.9  1.57 
1978  5.4  34.0  26.8  15.9  17.9  1.53 
1979  4.7  33.2  25.8  16.6  19.7  1.54 
1980  9.4  34.2  21.6  13.0  21.8  1.58 
1981  6.3  34.5  21.9  13.9  23.4  1.59 
1982  6.8  36.4  20.4  12.8  23.6  1.63 
1983  5.1  38.6  20.1  12.4  23.9  1.64 
1984  5.0  37.0  21.3  14.2  22.5  1.63 
Sources:  Average  number  of search  methods  used is from  BLS, Handbook  of Labor  Statistics  (June  1985),  table 
35, pp. 85-88, and from  Employment  and Earnings,  vol. 33 (January  1986).  Major  activity  of the unemployed  was 
computed  by the author  using  data  from  the Current  Population  Survey  for May  of each year. Figures  are rounded. 
a. Includes  those unemployed  who are listed  as unable  to work. 
26. A phone call to the Bureau  of Labor Statistics did not succeed in eliciting  any 
information  about  the  nature  of the  answers  categorized  as "other"  beyond  the  observation 
that  it included  persons  labeling  themselves  as retired. Cq  t 
r?e'1o0ON  '~~O?NONON- 
00 
* 
)N  .}  06  6  (  4 
ONx'I  f)  OC0 
en  O 
O  OCC 
1 - 
1-  Ic  ,:^t 0  0  W) W) OC OC (O  C)  X 
C.  r-NO  C;  C  (0003OC  o~~~- 00  (O  Ic  cq  OC  W)  'I  en  'I  It  ent 
00  b  t  0  t  m  o. 
O  N  -  O  O  O  i  O  t  O  O  ' 
Cq~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' 







ON  N  "C  "  C)  O'  "  C)  "C  c  l00  q"C  ON  en~ 
06 
0  0 
t  Y~~~t 
o  .0  , 
O 
O0  0  0  0_ 
9  <t_^  ?? m  NN  00 
C.  - 
O  ?  t  o  lClrON  ?O  ClClr  t  CNO  H Lawrence H. Summers  363 
whose primary  activity  is looking  for work are concentrated  among  job 
losers and  leavers. 
Given the ambiguities  associated  with the "other" category, it is not 
clear how to interpret  these figures. They may well be related to the 
greater  increase  in unemployment  among  men  than  among  women. They 
may also have something  to do with broader  social trends  regarding  the 
division of family responsibilities  between men and women. Another 
possibility  is that single  men, who have increased  as a share  of the male 
labor  force in recent years, feel less pressure  to look for work  than  their 
married  counterparts. 
All of the information  presented  so far on the increase in unemploy- 
ment suggests that it is a serious problem. Increases in normal  unem- 
ployment reflect neither measurement  problems nor changes in the 
demographic  composition  of the labor  force. Rather,  unemployment  has 
increased  in those segments  of the population  where  it is most serious- 
among  married  men,  job losers, and  the long-term  unemployed. 
Regional Differences  in Unemployment 
So far my object  has been more  to account  for the observed  increase 
in unemployment  than to explain it. Inevitably, aggregate  time series 
data  are  not rich  enough  to distinguish  alternative  explanations  for rising 
unemployment.  In seeking explanations, I turn to information  on the 
different  labor  market  experiences  of different  parts  of the country.27 
Data  by state  reflect  widely  noted  patterns  in  recent  regional  economic 
growth. During  the past fifteen years, for example, New England  has 
performed  extraordinarily  well, while the North Central  States have 
fared poorly. California's  economy has done well, while Alabama, 
Mississippi,  and Louisiana  have suffered  significant  increases  in unem- 
ployment. 
The data  reveal significant  volatility  in the pattern  of state unemploy- 
27. Studies  exploring  aspects  of the geographic  distribution  of unemployment  include 
Robert  E. Hall, "Turnover  in the Labor Force," BPEA, 3:1972, pp. 709-56; Medoff, 
"U.S.  Labor Markets"; and Stephen T. Marston, "Two Views of the Geographic 
Distribution  of Unemployment,"  Quarterly  Journal of Economics, vol. 100 (February 
1985),  pp.  57-79, among  many  others.  The  view  of geographic  differences  in  unemployment 
put  forward  here  parallels,  in some respects,  that  of Hall  and  Marston. 364  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
ment  rates. The correlation  between 1970  and 1985  state unemployment 
rates was 0.54. Somewhat  surprisingly,  the correlation  between unem- 
ployment  rates in the mid-1970s  and 1985  was significantly  lower. For 
example,  the correlation  between unemployment  rates  in 1976  and 1985 
was only 0.03, and  the correlation  between unemployment  rates in 1978 
and 1985  was 0.33. That volatility over the past fifteen years indicates 
that  regional  information  has the potential  to illuminate  the causes of the 
observed  increase  in normal  unemployment.28 
EMPLOYMENT  OPPORTUNITIES  AND  UNEMPLOYMENT 
One explanation  for regional unemployment  differentials  is differ- 
ences in industrial  composition.  For  example,  the problems  of the North 
Central  area  are often attributed  to its heavy reliance  on manufacturing, 
while the strength  of the New England  economy is explained by the 
growth  in its "high-tech"  industries.  To the extent that regional  differ- 
ences in unemployment  reflect only differences  in industrial  composi- 
tion, however, they can explain  only a little of the observed  increase in 
aggregate  unemployment. 
In order to explore the importance  of such composition effects in 
explaining  differences  in state unemployment  rates, I used direct  infor- 
mation from the CPS to compute adjusted state unemployment  rates 
that  control  for differences  in demographic,  educational,  industrial,  and 
occupational  composition  among  states. I used data  from  the May CPS 
for selected years to  estimate an equation relating an individual's 
employment  status  to his age, sex, and  marital  characteristics,  two-digit 
industry,  one-digit  occupation,  educational  attainment,  and his state of 
residence.29  Using the coefficients  on the state dummies,  I constructed 
adjusted  unemployment  rates  and  then  normalized  them  so that  average 
adjusted  unemployment  would  equal  average  unemployment  as officially 
reported  for the entire  year. 
28. U.S. Department  of Labor, Bureau  of Labor Statistics, Geographic  Profile of 
Employment and Unemployment,  1985 (September 1986) and earlier issues. 
29. The variables  included  in the equation  used to construct  adjusted  state  unemploy- 
ment rates were age, sex, age-sex, marital  status-sex, education, education squared, 
education-sex,  education  squared-sex,  race,  center  city status,  one-digit  occupation,  two- 
digit  industry,  and  state  dummies. Lawrence H. Summers  365 
Table 9 presents both actual and adjusted  unemployment  rates for 
each state for 1984, the most recent year for which it was possible to 
compute  adjusted  unemployment  rates. The striking  feature  of the data 
is the similarity  between the actual and adjusted  unemployment  rates. 
The correlation  of the two variables  is 0.84. While  the adjustments  go in 
the expected direction,  reducing  unemployment  in the Rust Belt states, 
for example, by recognizing  the poor performance  of manufacturing  in 
recent years, they are not large. Before adjustment  for industry and 
occupation, the difference  between the unemployment  rate in Massa- 
chusetts and that in Ohio was 4.6 percentage  points; after adjustment, 
the difference fell to 3.4 points. Only a relatively small fraction of 
differences  in unemployment  rates among states can be explained by 
differences  in the characteristics  of workers  or  jobs. This conclusion is 
robust. It holds for other years, for changes as well as levels  of 
unemployment,  and  for employment  as well. 
This finding  suggests that much of the difference in unemployment 
rates reflects differences across states in the performance  of given 
industries  rather  than  differences  in the industrial  composition  of states. 
Or it could reflect  differences  in labor  market  conditions  that influence 
the willingness to supply labor. Table 10 presents estimates of the 
relationship  between employment  growth,  its components,  and  changes 
in unemployment  over various sample  periods. The first  column  of the 
table  presents  evidence  on the relationship  between  overall  employment 
growth and unemployment.  While the relationship  has the expected 
negative sign, it is surprisingly  weak. For example, during  1970-85, a 
hypothetical  state that experienced a 30 percent, or 2 percent a year, 
growth  in employment  would have enjoyed only a 0.5 percentage  point 
decline  in  unemployment.  Over  shorter  periods,  the  relationship  between 
employment  growth  and changes  in unemployment  is somewhat  tighter 
but still not strong.  Between 1981  and 1985,  a state that experienced  an 
extra 2 percent a year of employment growth would have seen its 
unemployment  rate  decline by only 0.7 percent.30 
30. Employment  growth  will fail to lead to equal  percentage  reductions  in unemploy- 
ment if it is associated either with population  growth or with increases in labor force 
participation.  Results  not  reported  here  indicate  that  employment  growth  rates  are  strongly 
associated  with  population  growth  across states  and  only weakly  associated  with  changes 
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Table 9.  Actual and Adjusted State Unemployment Rates, 1984 
Percent 
State  and region  Actual  rate  Adjusted ratea 
New  England 
Maine  6.1  6.6 
New Hampshire  4.3  6.2 
Vermont  5.2  6.8 
Massachusetts  4.8  5.6 
Rhode Island  5.3  6.9 
Connecticut  4.6  5.8 
Mid-Atlantic 
New York  7.2  6.4 
New Jersey  6.2  6.7 
Pennsylvania  9.1  8.2 
East North  Central 
Ohio  9.4  9.0 
Indiana  8.6  7.7 
Illinois  9.1  9.2 
Michigan  11.2  10.0 
Wisconsin  7.3  8.0 
West North  Central 
Minnesota  6.3  5.2 
Iowa  7.0  7.9 
Missouri  7.2  8.0 
North Dakota  5.1  6.5 
South Dakota  4.3  5.1 
Nebraska  4.4  4.6 
Kansas  5.2  6.6 
South Atlantic 
Delaware  6.2  6.4 
Maryland  5.4  6.3 
District  of Columbia  9.0  8.2 
Virginia  5.0  6.0 
West Virginia  15.0  15.6 
North Carolina  6.7  5.5 
South Carolina  7.1  5.1 
Georgia  6.0  5.2 
Florida  6.3  6.2 
East  South Central 
Kentucky  9.3  8.8 
Tennessee  8.6  8.1 
Alabama  11.1  7.8 
Mississippi  10.8  7.7 Lawrence H. Summers  367 
The empirical  finding  that changes in state unemployment  rates are 
only weakly related  to total employment  growth  is vividlyillustrated  by 
Massachusetts,  which in 1985 had the nation's lowest unemployment 
rate. While the "Massachusetts  Miracle" has been widely discussed, 
the data  in table 11  reveal  that  employment  growth  in Massachusetts  has 
actually  been below national  employment  growth  over the past decade 
despite the state's 5.5 percentage  point reduction  in its unemployment 
rate.3"  In an arithmetic  sense, the apparent  success of the Massachusetts 
economy is less the result  of job creation  than  of circumstances  that  led 
to relatively  slow labor  force growth. 
While  the relationship  between  total  employment  growth  and  changes 
in unemployment  is weak, the second and third columns of table 10 
Table 9.  (Continued) 
Percent 
State  and region  Actual  rate  Adjusted ratea 
West South Central 
Arkansas  8.9  8.3 
Louisiana  10.0  9.6 
Oklahoma  7.0  6.9 
Texas  5.9  4.9 
Mountain 
Montana  7.4  8.5 
Idaho  7.2  7.2 
Wyoming  6.3  8.9 
Colorado  5.6  6.7 
New Mexico  7.5  8.3 
Arizona  5.0  5.3 
Utah  6.5  7.8 
Nevada  7.8  7.2 
Pacific 
Washington  9.5  8.4 
Oregon  9.4  9.6 
California  7.8  6.8 
Alaska  10.0  9.3 
Hawaii  5.6  4.3 
Sources:  Actual unemployment  rates are from U.S. Bureau  of the Census, Statistical  Abstract  of the United 
States, 1986  (GPO,  1986),  p. 409. Adjusted  unemployment  rates  were calculated  by the author  using  the May 1984 
CPS. 
a. Adjusted  unemployment  rates are computed  relative  to Washington,  D.C., and are then scaled so that the 
average  adjusted  unemployment  rate  equals  the national  average  unemployment  rate. 
31. Fora comprehensive  discussion  of the Massachusetts  experience,  see Helen  Ladd 
and  Ronald  Ferguson,  "Massachusetts'  Economic  Development:  A Case  Study,"  Working 
Paper  (Harvard  University,  Kennedy  School  of Government,  1986). 368  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
indicate that the relationship  between growth in employment  in high- 
wage industries-manufacturing,  construction,  mining,  and public  util- 
ities-and  unemployment  is significantly  stronger  than  the relationship 
between overall employment  growth  or growth  in low-wage industries 
and  unemployment.32  The estimates  in the last two columns  come from 
Table 10.  Employment Growth and Changes in Unemployment, 
Various Periods,  1970-85a 
Employment  change  decomposed 
Change  in  Change  in 
high-wage  non-high-wage 
Percentage  employment  as  employment  as 
change  in  a percentage  a percentage 
total  of total  of total 
Interval  employment  employment  employment 
1970-85  -0.017  ...  ... 
(0.008) 
1975-85  -0.035  -0.151  0.037 
(0.026)  (0.047)  (0.035) 
1976-85  -0.073  -0.167  0.000 
(0.027)  (0.045)  (0.038) 
1977-85  -0.083  -0.168  -0.002 
(0.026)  (0.044)  (0.043) 
1978-85  -  0.087  -0.145  -  0.025 
(0.026)  (0.045)  (0.046) 
1979-85  -0.082  -0.144  -0.017 
(0.029)  (0.051)  (0.053) 
1980-85  -0.057  -0.139  0.004 
(0.032)  (0.057)  (0.047) 
1981-85  -0.083  -0.147  -0.036 
(0.038)  (0.064)  (0.049) 
1982-85  -0.150  -0.326  -0.049 
(0.054)  (0.074)  (0.059) 
1983-85  -0.126  -0.260  -0.076 
(0.062)  (0.096)  (0.066) 
1984-85  -0.227  -0.182  -  0.232 
(0.062)  (0.134)  (0.062) 
Source:  Author's  calculations  using  data  from  BLS, Employment  and Earnings,  various  issues. 
a. Dependent  variable  is the change  in unemployment,  regressed  on a constant  and the percentage  change in 
employment  of nonagricultural  wage and salary  workers  (first  column)  and alternatively  as the percentage  change 
decomposed  into high-wage  and non-high-wage  employment  (last two columns).  High-wage  employment  is defined 
as employment  in manufacturing,  mining,  construction,  and transportation  and public  utilities.  Standard  errors  are 
in parentheses. 
32. See Alan B. Krueger  and Lawrence H. Summers, "Efficiency  Wages and the 
Wage Structure,"  Working  Paper 1952  (National  Bureau  of Economic Research, June 
1986),  for an examination  of the level of wages in different  industries  controlling  for the Lawrence H. Summers  369 
separate  regressions  in which the decomposed employment  change is 
substituted  for the total. Creating  or avoiding  the loss of "good" high- 
wage jobs appears  to be more potent in reducing  unemployment  than 
creating  low-wage  jobs. Further  estimates not reported  here that allow 
for a nonlinear  relationship  between changes  in high-wage  employment 
and unemployment suggest that the loss  of high-wage  jobs  has an 
especially large impact on unemployment. During 1979-85, a fairly 
representative  period, every one hundred  high-wage  jobs that  were lost 
raised  unemployment  by twenty-five  workers. In contrast,  the creation 
of high-wage  jobs had only a minor  impact  on unemployment.  The data 
in table 10 also reveal that over periods  longer  than a single year, there 
is essentially  no relationship  between growth  in low-wage employment 
and  unemployment. 
As table 11  indicates,  while  Massachusetts  did  not experience  unusual 
growth  in  total  employment,  its high-wage  employment  growth  exceeded 
Table 11.  Employment Growth and Unemployment in Massachusetts and the 
United States, Various Periods,  1976-85 
Percent  unless  otherwise  indicated 
Change  in 
ratio of 
Change in  high-wage 
unemployment  employment 
(percentage  Change  in  to total 
Period  points)  employment  employmenta 
Massachusetts 
1976-80  -  3.9  9.7  7.2 
1980-85  -  1.6  8.4  0.3 
1976-85  -5.5  18.9  7.5 
United States 
1976-80  -0.6  11.9  3.2 
1980-85  0.1  7.9  -0.5 
1976-85  -0.5  20.7  2.7 
Source:  Data  for United  States  are from  BLS, Handbook  of Labor  Statistics  (June  1985),  and,  for 1984  and 1985, 
from Employment  and Earnings,  vol.  33 (January 1986). Massachusetts  data  are from  Statistical  Abstract  of  the 
United States,  1986 and earlier issues. 
a. High-wage  employment  is defined  as employment  in manufacturing,  mining,  construction,  and transportation 
and  public  utilities. 
different  characteristics  of their  workers.  We estimate  wage premiums  of 12 percent  for 
manufacturing,  12 percent  for construction,  25 percent for mining,  and 25 percent for 
public  utilities. Very similar  results are obtained using data on workers who change 
industries. 370  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
that  of the rest of the country-though not by enough  to account  for the 
extraordinary  performance  of its economy. 
These findings  on the relationship  between changes in employment 
and  unemployment  are  instructive.  They suggest  that  in  analyzing  recent 
changes  in unemployment  in the United States, it is not enough  to focus 
on the determination  of the total level of employment.33  It is  also 
necessary to examine the composition of employment  growth and to 
consider  the incentives  individuals  may have to remain  unemployed. 
WHAT  IS  INVOLUNTARY  UNEMPLOYMENT? 
As countless analysts have pointed out, the notion of invol-dntary 
unemployment  involves important  logical difficulties. The argument 
usually goes something  like this: virtually  everyone counted as unem- 
ployed could find  some type ofjob at some wage; even if not, the option 
of self-employment  is surely  open; in the sense that  there  is some option 
open to all the unemployed, there is a voluntary component to all 
unemployment.34  Careful  critics of the concept of involuntary  unem- 
ployment are quick to stress that labeling  unemployment  as voluntary 
does not make it benign  or socially inconsequential.  But they do stress 
that a proper  analysis of its causes requires  recognizing  its voluntary 
element. 
The standard  response to this line of argument  is usually to conjure 
up images of the Great  Depression, to highlight  the personal  and social 
costs of unemployment,  and then to take refuge in some notion that 
unemployment  is involuntary  only when "reasonable"  jobs are not 
available.  Without  some  specification  of what  is meant  by a "reasonable" 
job, the concept  of involuntary  unemployment  is vague, but, at the same 
time, it does seem to capture an important  aspect of what many see 
happening  over the course of cyclical fluctuations. 
Perhaps  the most coherent set of attempts  to justif  the concept of 
involuntary  unemployment  relies on some notion of segmented labor 
33. Increasing  unemployment  in Europe  has been associated  with a cessation of job 
creation  distinguishing  it sharply  from  the United  States. 
34. For perhaps  the best-known  recent attack  on the concept of involuntary  unem- 
ployment, see Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Unemployment  Policy," American Economic 
Review,  vol. 68 (May 1978, Papers and Proceedings,  1977), pp. 353-57. Lawrence H. Summers  371 
markets.35  Where employed workers of a given ability do not receive 
equal compensation,  a meaningful  definition  of involuntary  unemploy- 
ment  is possible. A worker  may be defined  as involuntarily  unemployed 
if he is unable  to get ajob at a wage that other  workers  of his ability  are 
receiving, even if he could get an alternative  lower-wage  job. If labor 
markets  are  segmented  so that  there  are  differences  in  employed  workers' 
compensation  unrelated  to differences  in their ability, it is possible to 
observe  unemployment  that  has  both  voluntary  and  involuntary  aspects. 
It is voluntary in the sense that unemployed workers decline some 
opportunities  to work. But it is involuntary  in the sense that  others with 
the same  ability  as the  unemployed  are  working  at wages  the  unemployed 
would be willing to accept. Segmented labor markets raise another 
possibility  as well. Some of the unemployed  may prefer  low-wage  jobs 
to being unemployed, but choose to remain unemployed in order to 
queue  for high-wage  jobs. 
Any explanation  of involuntary  unemployment  that relies on labor 
market  segmentation  must account for the differences  in the wages of 
equally  skilled  workers  in different  industries.  More  specifically,  it must 
explain why high-wage  employers who face an excess supply of labor 
do not reduce  wages. A convincing  segmented-market  interpretation  of 
unemployment  should  also be able  to explain  why workers  would  choose 
to remain  unemployed  in order  to wait for high-wage  jobs, rather  than 
wait while working  at lower-paying  positions. I take up these issues in 
turn. 
There  are three broad  classes of explanations  for the failure  of high- 
wage employers  to reduce  their  wages in the face of an excess supply  of 
labor.  The most obvious is that there  are institutional  impediments  that 
make it impossible. Unions are one such impediment;  regulations  are 
35. For arguments  along  the lines sketched  here, see John  R. Harris  and Michael  P. 
Todaro,  "Migration,  Unemployment  and  Development:  A Two Sector  Analysis,"  Amer- 
ican  Economic  Review,  vol. 60 (March  1970),  pp. 126-42; Robert  E. Hall, "The Rigidity 
of Wages and the Persistence  of Unemployment,"  BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 301-35; Ian M. 
McDonald  and Robert M. Solow, "Wages and Employment  in a Segmented Labor 
Market," Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol.  100 (November  1985), pp.  1115-41;  and 
Jeremy  I. Bulow and Lawrence  H. Summers,  "A Theory  of Dual Labor  Markets  with 
Application  to Industrial  Policy,  Discrimination,  and  Keynesian  Unemployment,"  Journal 
of Labor  Economics,  vol. 4 (July  1986),  pp. 376-414. 372  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
another.36  But even in the absence of these institutions, there are 
substantial  differentials  in the wages different  types of employers  pay to 
similarworkers.37  A second  class of explanations  for  wage  differentials-- 
labeled  efficiency  wage theories-holds  that  firms  find  it profitable  over 
some range  to increase  their  wages even in the face of an excess supply 
of labor. By paying higher  wages, firms  enhance productivity  through 
improved  work-force  morale, reduced turnover  and hiring  costs, and 
increased  worker  effort.38  A third  class of explanations-insider-outsider 
theories-involves the notion  of rent  sharing  between  workers  and  firms. 
Because hiring  and training  new workers  is costly, incumbent  workers 
have leverage and so are able to capture  a share of the rents that firms 
earn. Firms  are therefore  unable  to reduce  wages even in the face of an 
excess supply  of labor. An important  piece of evidence to this effect is 
that high-wage  industries  and high-wage  firms  tend to pay all types of 
workers  high  wages.39 
All three  classes of explanations  for  the  failure  of high-wage  employers 
to reduce  wages when labor  supply  is excessive support  the plausibility 
of segmented  labor  markets  and  thus  explain  the existence  of involuntary 
unemployment  as I have defined  it. But on the arguments  developed so 
far,  unemployment  exists only  because  the unemployed  prefer  remaining 
unemployed  to accepting  work  in  low-wage  industries.  Given  the  general 
empirical  finding  that labor supply is relatively inelastic, it is unlikely 
36. For the importance  of regulation,  see Hall, "The Rigidity  of Wages"; for the 
effects of unions,  see McDonald  and  Solow, "Wages  and  Employment." 
37. This point  has been recognized  by institutional  labor  economists  for many  years. 
A recent  review of the evidence on wage differentials  may be found  in Alan B. Krueger 
and  Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Reflections  on the  Inter-industry  Wage  Structure,"  Working 
Paper  1968  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  June 1986).  Similar  conclusions  are 
reached in William  Dickens and Lawrence Katz, "Industry  and Occupational  Wage 
Patterns  and  Theories  of Wage  Determination"  (Harvard  University,  1986). 
38. Foran  excellent  summary  of various  efficiency  wage  theories  and  a strong  argument 
for their relevance to macroeconomics,  see Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Theories of Wage 
Rigidity,"  in  James  L. Butkiewicz,  Kenneth  J. Koford,  and  Jeffrey  B. Miller,  eds., Keynes' 
Economic  Legacy:  Contemporary Economic  Theories (Praeger, 1986), pp. 153-206.  For 
a survey  of some of the relevant  empirical  literature,  see Lawrence  F. Katz, "Efficiency 
Wage  Theories:  A Partial  Evaluation,"  in Stanley  Fischer,  ed., NBER  Macroeconomics 
Annual 1986 (MIT, 1986), pp. 235-76. 
39. This finding  is reported  by William  Dickens and Lawrence  Katz, "Interindustry 
Wage  Differences  and  Industry  Characteristics"  (Harvard  University,  1986);  and  by Erica 
Lynn Groshen, "Sources of Within Industry  Wage Dispersion:  Do Wages Vary By 
Employer?"  (Ph.D. dissertation,  Harvard  University,  1986). Lawrence H. Summers  373 
that a large number  of workers  will be willing to work at high-  but not 
low-wage  jobs. A more compelling  explanation  of involuntary  unem- 
ployment  would explain why workers  choose to forgo low-wage work 
in order  to seek high-wage  work. 
In their  paper  on unemployment  in less developed countries, Harris 
and Todaro offered a very plausible answer to this question. They 
explained  that the high-wage  jobs were in the city while the low-wage 
jobs were in rural  areas. It was thus impossible  to queue  for a high-wage 
job while holding  a low-wage  job. The market  equilibrated  when unem- 
ployment in the city was sufficiently  high and the chance of getting a 
high-wage  job in the city sufficiently  small that workers would opt for 
the certainty  of a low-wage  job in the country. 
Such  an  explanation  is not  plausible  for  developed  economies.  Perhaps 
the most plausible explanation  for what has been called "transitional 
unemployment"  is that workers who have lost high-wage  jobs find it 
difficult  to accept their fate and so prefer remaining  unemployed to 
acknowledging  the permanence  of their  loss by taking  a low-wage  job.40 
In a society where status  is highly  bound  up with one's occupation,  it is 
to be expected that workers  who lose attractive  high-wage  jobs will be 
reluctant  to accept lesserjobs. 
Also, there are fixed costs for workers  as well as firms  in entering  an 
employment  relationship,  so that  workers  who expect to return  to high- 
wage  jobs in a relatively  short time may find it difficult  or undesirable, 
or both, to take ajob at a low-wage  firm.  Something  of this sort must  lie 
behind firms' reluctance  to hire "overqualified  workers." The unem- 
ployed may also feel that  accepting  a low-wage  job suggests  to potential 
high-wage  employers that they are not qualified  for better  jobs and so 
reduces  their  chance of getting  them. Finally, in some circumstances  it 
may  be more  efficient  to search  while remaining  unemployed  than  while 
working. 
While  the idea of transitional  unemployment  can easily be criticized 
by pointing to the costs to workers of remaining  unemployed, the 
empirical  observation  that  total employment  growth  in a given state has 
only a very limited  impact  on unemployment  does suggest  that  a theory 
40. I borrow the term "transitional  unemployment"  from McDonald  and Solow, 
"Segmented  Labor  Market."  I use it to refer  to the unemployment  of workers  transiting 
in both  directions  between  the high-  and  low-wage  sectors  of the economy. 374  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
of transitional  unemployment  is preferable  to simple  theories based on 
wage rigidities. If involuntary  unemployment  were caused by rigid 
wages, one would expect it to be sharply  reduced  by movements  in the 
demand  for labor, and thus employment,  in a given state. The fact that 
it is not makes it worthwhile  at least to explore labor supply  aspects of 
the determination  of unemployment.  The empirical  finding  that reduc- 
tions in high-wage  employment  increase unemployment  and that this 
impact  is not easily offset by growth  in low-wage employment  suggests 
that  the transitional  unemployment  suffered  by persons  losing  high-wage 
jobs is significant. 
UNIONS  AND  UNEMPLOYMENT 
To understand  the causes of the high and rising normal level of 
unemployment,  it may be desirable  to focus on the factors influencing 
the extent of "transitional  unemployment." Without embracing  any 
theory  of the cause of transitional  unemployment,  the preceding  discus- 
sion suggests that  its extent is likely to be determined  by the size of the 
wage differentials  between high-  and low-wage  jobs, the availability  of 
high-wagejobs,  and  the costs, pecuniary  and  nonpecuniary,  of remaining 
unemployed.  Although  all these factors are difficult  to quantify,  it is a 
reasonable  conjecture  that in areas where the level of unionization  is 
high, ceteris paribus,  there should  be more  transitional  unemployment. 
This is especially the case when, as in recent years, the economy is 
subjected to large intersectoral shocks. High and rising union wage 
premiums  are likely to cause job losses in the unionized sector of the 
economy  and  also to make  those who lose high-wagejobs  more  reluctant 
to accept alternative lower-wage employment. The empirical work 
presented in table 12 examines the conjecture that unions increase 
unemployment. 
In investigating  the relationship  between  unionization  and  unemploy- 
ment,  the critical  empirical  problem  is eliminating  other  factors  that  may 
be correlated  with both. Most obviously, the high-wage  sector of the 
economy tends to be more highly unionized than other parts of the 
economy  and  in recent  years  has suffered  high  unemployment.  I address 
this issue in several ways. First, I estimate the relationship  between 
unionization  and  both  actual  unemployment  rates  and  the  unemployment 
rates adjusted for changes in the composition of the labor force, as Lawrence H. Summers  375 
Table 12.  Unionization and State Unemployment Rates,  1970-85a 
Share in 
high-  Instru- 
wage  Region  mental 
Year  Intercept  Union  industries  dummies  variables  R2 
1970  3.43  0.044  ...  No  No  0.096 
(0.493)  (0.019) 
1970  4.97  0.059  -0.063  No  No  0.231 
(0.681)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
1970  5.55  0.053  -0.027  Yes  No  0.540 
(1.06)  (0.028)  (0.036) 
1970  3.23  0.053  ...  No  Yes  0.093 
(0.784)  (0.032) 
1970  5.18  0.048  ...  Yes  Yes  0.561 
(1.35)  (0.041) 
1985  5.45  0.085  ...  No  No  0.309 
(0.750)  (0.036) 
1985  4.59  0.081  0.035  No  No  0.099 
(1.62)  (0.038)  (0.053) 
1985  3.46  0.117  0.042  Yes  No  0.554 
(2.01)  (0.045)  (0.057) 
1985  6.31  0.040  ...  No  Yes  0.073 
(1.20)  (0.061) 
1985  3.60  0.145  ...  Yes  Yes  0.549 
(2.60)  (0.085) 
1970-85  1.67  0.039  ...  No  No  0.044 
(0.666)  (0.026) 
1970-85  0.10  -0.009  0.106  No  No  0.323 
(0.805)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
1970-85  -1.57  0.062  0.034  Yes  No  0.609 
(1.22)  (0.033)  (1.47) 
1970-85  3.05  -0.019  ...  No  Yes  -  0.054 
(1.11)  (0.045) 
1970-85  -0.77  0.063  ...  Yes  Yes  0.585 
(1.73)  (0.053) 
Source: Author's calculations  based on data from the following sources. Unemployment  and manufacturing 
employment  data  for 1970  are from  U.S. Bureau  of the Census,  Census  of Population,  1970,  vol. 1, Characteristics 
of the Population,  section 1, U.S. Summary  (GPO, 1972),  pp. 1-469. Unionization  rates for 1970  are from BLS, 
Directory  of  National  Unions  and  Employee  Associations  1979,  BLS  Bulletin  2079  (September  1980),  p.  109. 
Unemployment  and  manufacturing  employment  for 1985  are  from  Employment  and  Earnings,  vol. 33 (January  1986). 
Unionization  rates  used  in 1985  regressions  are 1982  rates  obtained  from  Leo Troy  and  Neil Sheflin,  Union  Sourcebook 
(West  Orange,  New Jersey, Industrial  Relations  Data  and Information  Services, 1985),  table  7.2, p. 7-4, as no more 
recent  unionization  rates  could  be obtained. 
a. Dependent  variable  is the unemployment  rate  regressed  on a constant  and  the level of unionization  and, where 
indicated,  the percent  of workers  in high-wage  industries  (manufacturing,  construction,  mining,  and transportation 
and public  utilities),  region dummies,  and a dummy  instrumental  variable  for a state with a right-to-work  law. 
Regional  divisions  correspond  to the nine U.S. Census  divisions.  The regression  excludes  the District  of Columbia 
since no independent  unionization  figures  for D.C. were published  in 1970.  Standard  errors  are in parentheses. 376  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
described earlier. Because the results are broadly similar  for the two 
concepts and because data  on official  unemployment  are available  over 
alonger  time  span,  only  results  using  official  unemployment  are  reported. 
Second, in several  of the specifications  reported  in table 12,  I control  for 
the share  of the high-wage  sector (or  alternatively  the share  of manufac- 
turing)  in total employment  and for regions in estimating  the effect of 
unionization  on unemployment.  Third,  I treat unionization  as endoge- 
nous and use the presence or absence of a right-to-work  law as an 
instrument.  Nineteen states have such laws, almost all of which were 
put in place before 1960,  so it is plausible  to take the presence  of a right- 
to-work  law as exogenous. A number  of investigators  have found that 
right-to-work  laws have a significant  effect on union  coverage.41 
The results in table 12 support  several conclusions. First, there is a 
clear and substantively significant impact of  unionization on  state 
unemployment  rates. The estimates for 1985, controlling  for both the 
region and the share of employment  in high-wage  industries, suggest 
that an increase of 10 percentage  points in a state's unionization  rate 
increases  its unemployment  rate  by 1.2  percentage  points. Because there 
are  substantial  regional  differences  in the degree  of unionization  (in 1982, 
Texas, with 12.5 percent of its work force unionized, was the fortieth 
most unionized state, while Pennsylvania,  with 27.0 percent, ranked 
tenth), those differences can account for quantitatively  important  re- 
gional variations in the extent of unemployment. Second, there is 
suggestive evidence that the impact of unionization  on unemployment 
has increased over time. The estimated equation for the change in 
unemployment  between 1970  and 1985,  holding  constant  the high-wage 
share  of employment  and region, suggests  that a state with a 20 percent 
unionization  rate, approximately  the sample average, experienced an 
increase in unemployment  of 1.2 percentage  points relative to a hypo- 
thetical  state that had no unions. In this sense, a significant  part of the 
observed increase in normal unemployment  in recent years may be 
attributed  to the effects of unions.42 
41. See, for example, Henry S. Farber, "Right-to-Work  Laws and the Extent of 
Unionization,"  Journal of Labor Economics,  vol. 2 (July 1984), pp. 319-52. 
42. The  increase  is partially  offset  by  the  decline  in  union  coverage  of about4  percentage 
points  between 1970  and 1982.  The coefficient  estimates  for 1985  imply  that  the decline  in 
union membership  reduced  the unemployment  rate by about 0.5 percentage  point. Of 
course,  to the extent that  union  coverage  declined  because  union  members  were laid  off, 
the decline  in union  membership  may, over a long  transition  period,  actually  have further 
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In their widely read book What  Do Unions Do?, Richard  Freeman 
and  James  Medoff  estimate  that  highly  unionized  states have on average 
an unemployment  rate that is 1 percentage point higher than that of 
"low" union states.43  That finding  parallels  the one reported  here. But 
they report  being unable  to find any relationship  between unionization 
and the fraction of the population  employed in a state, and they infer 
from that that unions may draw workers into the labor force but that 
they do not reduce  employment.  My own  findings  differ.  Table  13  reports 
estimates  of the impact  of unionization  on the employment  ratio. While 
the impact  is estimated  less precisely than  the impact  of unionization  on 
the state  unemployment  rates  in  table 12,  the results  strongly  corroborate 
the conclusions reached using unemployment  data. In fact, in most 
specifications,  the impact of unionization  on the employment  ratio is 
greater  than its impact  on the unemployment  rate. For example, when 
the region and the share of employment in high-wage  industries are 
controlled  for, the data  suggest  that  in 1985  an increase  of 10  percentage 
points  in the fraction  of the work  force that  was unionized  would  reduce 
the employment  ratio  by almost  4 percent. Likewise, in most but not all 
specifications, the impact of unionization on the employment ratio 
increased by more between 1970 and 1985 than did the impact of 
unionization  on unemployment. 
In results not reported  here, I have explored  the robustness  of these 
conclusions  in a number  of ways. First,  I have estimated  the relationship 
between unionization,  unemployment,  and the employment  ratio  using 
data  for every year  between 1970  and 1985.  The data  confirm  the upward 
trend in the impact of unionization. In fact, the trend appears more 
dramatic  when results for the early 1970s  are compared  with those for 
the early 1980s. Second, I have estimated the effects of unions on 
unemployment  rates  separately  for male  and  female  workers.  The  results 
indicate  that  unions  have a somewhat  greater  impact  on male  unemploy- 
ment. Third,  I have reestimated  the equations  after combining  smaller 
states into larger  units as was done by the CPS in the early 1970s. The 
reestimate  has little impact  on the results. Further  corroboration  for the 
conclusions reached here comes from the work of other investigators 
using  data  on metropolitan  areas  rather  than  states. For  example,  Edward 
Montgomery,  using data  on forty-four  standard  metropolitan  statistical 
43. Richard  Freeman  and  James  Medoff, What  Do Unions  Do? (Basic Books, 1984), 
pp. 120-21. 378  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
Table 13.  Unionization and State Employment Ratios, 1970-85a 
Share in 
high-  Instru- 
wage  Region  mental 
Year  Intercept  Union  industries  dummies  variables  R2 
1970  4.021  -0.024  ...  No  No  0.001 
(0.027)  (0.107) 
1970  4.024  0.081  -0.139  No  No  0.032 
(0.040)  (0.133)  (0.132) 
1970  4.170  -0.329  0.025  Yes  No  0.393 
(0.064)  (0.169)  (0.213) 
1970  3.998  0.075  ...  No  Yes  -0.017 
(0.043)  (0.177) 
1970  4.170  -0.379  ...  Yes  Yes  0.315 
(0.088)  (0.267) 
1985  4.123  -0.193  ...  No  No  0.038 
(0.029)  (0.139) 
1985  4.192  -0.193  -0.258  No  No  0.071 
(0.061)  (0.143)  (0.200) 
1985  4.175  -0.363  0.042  Yes  No  0.451 
(0.083)  (0.188)  (0.237) 
1985  4.098  -0.063  ...  No  Yes  0.021 
(0.046)  (0.232) 
1985  4.192  -0.387  ...  Yes  Yes  0.447 
(0.106)  (0.349) 
1970-85  0.114  -0.186  ...  No  No  0.096 
(0.021)  (0.082) 
1970-85  0.171  -0.116  -0.252  No  No  0.252 
(0.029)  (0.098)  (0.097) 
1970-85  0.055  0.021  -0.145  Yes  No  0.577 
(0.044)  (0.118)  (0.147) 
1970-85  0.100  -0.128  ...  No  Yes  0.087 
(0.033)  (0.137) 
1970-85  0.000  0.083  ...  Yes  Yes  0.487 
(0.062)  (0.188) 
Source:  Author's  calculations  using  data  from  the following  sources.  Manufacturing  employment  data  for 1970  are 
from Census  of  Population,  1970,  U.S.  Summary,  pp. 1-469. Labor  force participation  data are from the same 
volume,  pp. 1-350.  Unionization  rates  for 1970  are from  Directory  of National  Unions and Employee Associations, 
1979,  p. 109. Employment  data for 1985  were obtained  from  Employment  and Earnings,  vol. 33 (January  1986). 
Population  by state  is the average  of the 1984  population  over age  fourteen  and  the 1984  population  over  age eighteen 
multiplied  by the growth  rate  of total  population  between  1984  and 1985.  Unionization  rates  used in 1985  regressions 
are 1982  rates  obtained  from  Troy  and Sheflin,  Union Sourcebook,  since no more  recent  unionization  rates  could  be 
obtained. 
a. Dependent  variable  is the log of the employment  ratio  regressed  on a constant,  the level of unionization,  and, 
where  indicated,  the percent  of workers  in high-wage  industries  (manufacturing,  construction,  mining,  and  transpor- 
tation  and public  utilities),  regional  dummies,  and a dummy  instrumental  variable  for a state with a right-to-work 
law. Regional  divisions correspond  to the nine U.S.  Census divisions. The regression  excludes the District of 
Columbia  since no independent  unionization  figures for D.C. were published  in 1970. Standard  errors are in 
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areas in 1983, finds a statistically  significant,  though not substantially 
large,  negative  impact  of unionization  on employment."4 
The conclusion  that  the impact  of unions  on unemployment  has been 
increasing is not surprising  given that the spread in wages between 
unionized  and nonunionized  workers has also increased, at least until 
recently.  Table 14  presents  some information  on changes  in the employ- 
ment cost index for unionized  and nonunionized  workers  during  1973- 
85 and shows that  union  wage premiums  increased  during  the 1970s  and 
have declined somewhat, but not enough to reverse their previous 
increase,  during  the 1980s.  Analyses using survey data  on the wages of 
individuals  also suggest  that  union  wage  premiums  rose during  the 1970s 
but find less evidence of a decline in the 1980s than is suggested by 
newspaper  headlines  and  the employment  cost index.45 
Table 14.  Annual Percentage Changes in the Employment Cost Index, 
by Union Status, 1973-85 
Employment cost  index  Cumulative 
Year  Union  Nonunion  difference 
1973a  5.7  5.5  0.2 
1974a  7.5  8.0  -0.3 
1975a  8.6  6.0  2.3 
1976  8.1  6.8  3.6 
1977  7.6  6.6  4.6 
1978  8.0  7.6  5.0 
1979  9.0  8.5  5.5 
1980  10.9  8.0  6.6 
1981  9.6  8.0  8.2 
1982  6.5  6.1  8.6 
1983  4.6  5.2  8.0 
1984  3.4  4.5  6.9 
1985  3.6  5.1  5.4 
Source:  Richard  B. Freeman,  "In  Search  of Union  Wage  Concessions  in Standard  Data  Sets," Industrial  Relations, 
vol. 25 (Spring  1986),  table  4, p. 139. 
a. Estimated  from  changes  in major  contract  settlements. 
44. Edward Montgomery, "The Impact of Regional Difference in Unionism on 
Employment,"  Economic  Review  of  the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Cleveland,  1:1986, 
pp.2-11. 
45. See Richard  B. Freeman, "In Search of Union Wage Concessions in Standard 
Data  Sets," Industrial  Relations,  vol. 25 (Spring  1986),  pp. 131-45;  and  Peter  Linneman 
and Michael  Wachter,  "Rising  Union Premiums  and the Declining  Boundaries  Among 
Noncompeting  Groups,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  76 (May  1986, Papers  and 
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The coincidence of rising union wage premiums  and an increasing 
impact of unionization  on state unemployment  rates, along with the 
widely observed decline in employment growth in unionized firms, 
makes  it plausible  that union  power has accounted  for a significant  part 
of the increase in normal  unemployment  in recent years. The fact that 
the loss of unionized  jobs resulted  in increased  unemployment  despite 
the rapid  creation  of jobs in the low-wage service sector provides some 
support  for the "transitional"  theory  of unemployment  advocated  here. 
FURTHER  EVIDENCE  ON  TRANSITIONAL  UNEMPLOYMENT 
The discussion so far suggests that increasing  union  wage premiums 
during  the 1970s  contributed  to the rising  rate of normal  unemployment 
by causing  an increase in transitional  unemployment.  Transitional  un- 
employment  is a likely concomitant  of any increase  in the importance  of 
noncompetitive  wage differentials,  whether  caused by unions or by the 
efficiency  wage and  rent sharing  considerations  discussed above. 
Table 15, which is drawn  from the work of Linda Bell and Richard 
Freeman, presents several different estimates of the extent of wage 
dispersion in the economy during 1970-85. Each of the measures 
indicates that wage dispersion  has increased.46  Rising  wage dispersion 
does not necessarily  indicate  an increase in the importance  of noncom- 
petitive wage differentials. It could occur because increases in the 
demand  for labor in high-wage  industries  moved firms along upward- 
sloping  short-run  labor  supply  curves. However, using  several  different 
data  sources, Bell and  Freeman  find  that  the correlation  across  industries 
between employment  growth  and wage growth  over the decade of the 
1970s was negative, which suggests that shocks in the wage-setting 
process  that  moved  firms  along  their  labor  demand  curves  predominated. 
Without  invoking  the considerations  leading  to labor  market  segmenta- 
tion, noted above, it is difficult  to account  for these shocks. 
It is likely that efficiency wage or rent-sharing  considerations  led to 
increases in noncompetitive  wage differentials  during  the 1970s. This 
inference  is supported  by evidence that  the gap  between the wages paid 
by small  firms  and those paid by large  firms  increased  during  the 1970s 
46. LindaAnnBellandRichardB.  Freeman,  "DoesaFlexible  Industry  Wage  Structure 
Increase  Employment?:  The U.S. Experience," in Linda  Ann Bell, "Essays on Labor 
Market  Efficiency"  (Ph.D. dissertation,  Harvard  University,  May 1986). Lawrence H. Summers  381 
even after adjustment  for unionization.47  Given the empirical  evidence 
presented  above regarding  the impact  of unionization  on employment, 
it seems plausible  that  the general  increase  in labor  market  segmentation 
over the past fifteen years has tended to raise the normal rate of 
unemployment,  though  the proposition  is difficult  to test. 
Finally, the transitional  unemployment  explanation  for rising  unem- 
ployment is also consistent with the information  on the nature  of the 
increase  in unemployment  presented  in the first  part  of this paper. It is 
most plausibly  job losers who would wait to regain high-wage  jobs. 
Investing  in waiting for a high-wage  job makes much more sense for 
mature  married  men, who as a group have a very low employment 
turnover  rate, than  for other  demographic  groups  that  have much  higher 
Table 15. Dispersion  in Wages  and Compensation,  1970-85 
Standard  deviation  of log 
National 
Average  income  and 
hourly  product  Census  of 
earnings  in  accounts  manufacturers 
Year  manufacturing  compensation  wages 
1970  0.215  0.255  0.221 
1971  0.226  0.266  0.222 
1972  0.237  0.278  0.237 
1973  0.240  0.280  0.242 
1974  0.241  0.285  0.240 
1975  0.253  0.303  0.247 
1976  0.257  0.311  0.252 
1977  0.258  0.316  0.260 
1978  0.267  0.319  0.269 
1979  0.270  0.324  0.279 
1980  0.270  0.335  0.282 
1981  0.277  0.339  n.a. 
1982  0.282  0.349  n.a. 
1983  0.286  n.a.  n.a. 
1984  0.291  n.a.  n.a. 
1985  0.293  n.a.  n.a. 
Source: Linda Ann Bell and Richard B. Freeman, "Does  a Flexible Industry Wage Structure Increase Employment?: 
The  U.S.  Experience,"  in Linda  Ann  Bell,  "Essays  on  Labor  Market Efficiency,"  (Ph.D.  dissertation,  Harvard 
University,  May 1986), table  1, p. 51. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
47. Nicole Gerris,  "The  Changing  Size Wage  Effect" (Undergraduate  thesis, Harvard 
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turnover  rates. Persons  losing high-wage  jobs are most likely to experi- 
ence protracted  spells of unemployment.  Sectoral  shocks leading  to the 
loss of high-wage  jobs would also lead to plant shutdowns, reducing 
capacity and thereby raising  capacity utilization.  In addition, sectoral 
shocks that hit at high-wage industries could easily account for the 
change  in the vacancies-unemployment  relationship,  if job losers were 
reluctant  to accept low-wage  employment  in expanding  sectors. 
Conclusions 
The analysis  in this paper  suggests  that the rise in normal  unemploy- 
ment over the past twenty years represents a serious problem. The 
additional  unemployment  is concentrated  among mature  married  men 
who have lost jobs and are likely to be out of work for periods of six 
months or more. Increased unemployment cannot be  convincingly 
dismissed as the consequence of marginal  labor force attachment  or 
measurement  problems  in the CPS. Nor is it simply  the result  of cyclical 
weakness in the economy. Persistently  high unemployment  has coin- 
cided with relatively  high  vacancy and  capacity  utilization  rates. 
These conclusions  have important  implications  for economic policy. 
First, they suggest  that while high unemployment  is a serious  problem, 
expansionary  aggregate  demand  policies  are  unlikely  to be able  to reduce 
it to the levels  of the  1950s and 1960s without creating excessive 
inflationary  pressures, unless they reverse the structural  changes that 
have taken place in recent years. Increased  union wage premiums  and 
wage dispersion  more generally  mean that in equilibrium  more people 
will lose high-wage  jobs and choose to remain  unemployed  longer than 
was previously  the case. The latter  effect is magnified  by the increasing 
tendency for the unemployed to be in families with other working 
members. Between 1977 and 1985, the share of unemployed  married 
males  who had  another  family  member  working  full time  increased  from 
37.4 percent  to 43.6 percent. 
Second, while expansionary policies are not likely to reduce the 
equilibrium  unemployment  rate, stable  fiscal and monetary  policies can 
probably  make a significant  contribution.  Since workers losing high- 
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over taking  a low-wage  job, policies that temporarily  contract  the high- 
wage  sector  of the  economy  are  likely  to create  structural  unemployment. 
There  may  be important  asymmetries  between the effects of expansion- 
ary and contractionary  policies. Policies that hurt  the high-wage  sector 
may create much more transitional  unemployment  than policies that 
promote it can alleviate if new high-wage  jobs are taken by workers 
other  than  those previously  laid off. 
The recent fiscal-monetary  mix and the associated squeeze on the 
high-wage  manufacturing  sector are instructive.  When  the manufactur- 
ing sector is squeezed, unemployment  increases sharply  as those who 
lose jobs wait to get them back. The eventual abnormal  increase in 
manufacturing  output  that  will be necessary  to service the trade  debt  the 
United States is now incurring  is unlikely  to reduce unemployment  by 
as much  as the contraction  increased  it. Comments 
and Discussion 
Katharine  G. Abraham: Lawrence Summers  argues  two main  points. 
First, the bulk of the increase in "normal" U.S. unemployment  since 
the mid-1960s  cannot be attributed  simply  to shifts in the demographic 
composition  of the work  force, but  has  been concentrated  among  mature 
men who lose their  jobs and experience extended spells of unemploy- 
ment. Second, this increase  in mature  male unemployment  has resulted 
in large part  from high and growing  noncompetitive  wage differentials, 
which  have contributed  to employment  declines  in the high-wage  sectors 
in the face of demand  shocks and led those who lose high-wage  jobs to 
hold out longer  in hopes of getting  their  old  jobs back. 
Let me start with Summer's "stylized facts" regarding  the decom- 
position of the observed increase in the U.S. unemployment  rate. It is 
true that no more than  a small  part  of the observed increase  in the U.S. 
unemployment  rate between 1965  and 1985  can be attributed  simply to 
shifts in the demographic  composition  of the labor  force towards  more 
unemployment-prone  workers.  However, Summers's  suggestion  that the 
increasing  level of educational  attainment  among  labor  force  participants 
has actually worked to decrease the unemployment  rate is open to 
question. Not having  more than an eighth-grade  education  or having  a 
college degree  both  obviously  mean  something  very different  for  today's 
new entrants  than for the cohorts that are currently  retiring.  Relative 
educational  attainment  within an age cohort probably  does affect em- 
ployment  prospects;  relative  educational  attainment  across age cohorts 
is unlikely  to matter  in the same way. 
Having  rejected  the idea that demographic  shifts in the composition 
of the labor force can explain the growth in unemployment,  Summers 
considers  how the increase  in unemployment  has  been distributed  across 
384 Lawrence H. Summers  385 
the labor  force. He emphasizes  the fact that,  over the 1965  to 1985  period 
taken as  a whole,  there have been larger cumulative increases in 
unemployment  among  mature  men than among  other groups. What  he 
does not emphasize  is that  the pattern  of unemployment  growth  looked 
very different prior to the late 1970s than it has since then. This is 
important,  because it means that no single explanation  for the upward 
drift  in U.S. unemployment,  including  Summers's  explanation,  is likely 
to apply  to the entire 1965  to 1985  period. 
Summers's tables 4 and 5 show that increases in unemployment 
between 1978  and 1985  were relatively  larger  for men aged thirty-five  to 
forty-four  and for married  men than  for other groups  and that the share 
of unemployment  attributable  to job losers and to those experiencing 
long spells of unemployment  rose. But between 1965 and 1974, the 
largest  increases in unemployment  occurred  among  young men, young 
women, and  older  women;  men  aged  thirty-five  to forty-four  experienced 
virtually  no change  in their  unemployment  rate, and  the unemployment 
rates  for older  men actually  fell. Between 1974  and 1978,  the increase  in 
unemployment  was spread  relatively  evenly across age-sex groups.  The 
statistics on unemployment  by marital status group show a similar 
pattern:  only  during  the 1978  to 1985  period  do married  men  and  divorced, 
separated,  and widowed men fare relatively worse than other groups. 
Data on unemployment  by reason-job  losers, job leavers, and so on- 
are not available before 1967, but the data on the distribution of 
unemployment  show  that  long-term  unemployment  became  dramatically 
more  important  only beginning  in 1978. 
Because using any particular  years for such an assessment may be 
misleading,  I have examined  some of these trends  using  annual  data.  My 
table 1 reports annual unemployment  rates since 1954 for men aged 
thirty-five  to forty-four  and  for married  men. These unemployment  rates 
were strikingly  stable  up until  the last few years. Regressions  of the two 
mature  male unemployment  rates on a constant, a time trend, and the 
overall  unemployment  rate  are summarized  in my table  2. These models 
bear  on the question  of whether  mature  males'  unemployment  rates  have 
in fact risen more  rapidly  than  the unemployment  rates of other  groups, 
as Summers  has asserted. Looking at the model for the entire 1954  to 
1985  period, the answer to that question would appear  to be a simple 
"no." However, fitting  separate  subperiod  models  indicates  that  mature 
men's unemployment  actually trended downwards  relative to overall 386  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
unemployment  through  the late 1970s,  though  it may have risen  relative 
to overall  unemployment  since then. Significantly,  the coefficients  in the 
earlier  subperiod  model are quite robust  to changes  in both the starting 
year  and  the ending  year used to estimate  the model. 
Table 1.  Aggregate and Mature Male Unemployment Rates,  1954-85 
Unemployment  rate 
Males 
aged  Married 
Year  35-44  malesa  Aggregate 
1954  4.1  n.a.  5.5 
1955  3.1  2.6  4.4 
1956  2;6  2.3  4.1 
1957  2.8  2.8  4.3 
1958  5.1  5.1  6.8 
1959  3.7  3.6  5.5 
1960  3.8  3.7  5.5 
1961  4.6  4.6  6.7 
1962  3.6  3.6  5.5 
1963  3.5  3.4  5.7 
1964  2.9  2.8  5.2 
1965  2.6  2.4  4.5 
1966  2.0  1.9  3.8 
1967  1.7  1.8  3.8 
1968  1.6  1.6  3.6 
1969  1.5  1.5  3.5 
1970  2.4  2.6  4.9 
1971  3.1  3.2  5.9 
1972  2.7  2.8  5.6 
1973  2.0  2.3  4.9 
1974  2.6  2.7  5.6 
1975  4.9  5.1  8.5 
1976  4.1  4.2  7.7 
1977  3.5  3.6  7.0 
1978  2.8  2.8  6.0 
1979  2.9  2.8  5.8 
1980  4.1  4.2  7.1 
1981  4.5  4.3  7.6 
1982  6.9  6.5  9.7 
1983  7.1  6.5  9.6 
1984  5.2  4.6  7.5 
1985  4.9  4.3  7.2 
Source: U.S.  Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Handbook of Labor Statistics,  Bulletin 2217 (June 
1985), and BLS,  Employment and Earnings,  vol.  33 (January 1986). 
n.a.  Not available. 
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In sum, the data show very clearly that only since the late 1970s  has 
increased  unemployment  among  mature  malejob  losers grown  markedly 
enough  to account  for a disproportionate  share  of the overall  growth  in 
unemployment.  Summers's  transitional  unemployment  story,  then,  should 
be considered  a story  about  the past six or seven years, not a story  about 
the past twenty years. 
The  transitional  unemployment  story  has  two parts.  Summers  believes 
both that noncompetitive  wage differentials  have contributed  to the 
effects of adverse shocks on layoffs and plant closings, particularly  in 
Table 2.  Unemployment Trends among Mature Males, Various Periods, 1954-85a 
Males  aged 35-44,  u1  Married males,  Ulb 
Civilian  Civilian 
Period  Trend  unemployment,  u  Trend  unemployment,  u 
Long periods 
1954-85b  -0.02  1.62  -0.01  1.56 
(5.6)  (16.9)  (7.6)  (25.9) 
1979-85  0.04  1.48  0.01  1.53 
(8.2)  (27.2)  (1.7)  (16.3) 
1954-79b  -0.02  1.46  -0.02  1.48 
(15.6)  (29.6)  (15.1)  (38.2) 
Vary start year 
1963-79  -0.02  1.45  -  0.02  1.43 
(5.2)  (18.7)  (8.1)  (36.6) 
1964-79  -0.02  1.44  -0.02  1.43 
(4.0)  (16.0)  (6.4)  (31.4) 
1965-79  -0.02  1.46  -0.02  1.47 
(3.4)  (14.1)  (7.1)  (32.6) 
1966-79  -0.02  1.41  -  0.02  1.48 
(2.3)  (13.6)  (5.9)  (29.5) 
1972-79  0.00  1.50  -0.01  1.47 
(0.2)  (15.1)  (3.0)  (27.4) 
Vary end year 
1964-79  -0.02  1.44  -0.02  1.43 
(4.0)  (16.0)  (6.4)  (31.4) 
1964-80  -0.02  1.43  -0.01  1.42 
(2.8)  (13.4)  (3.4)  (20.1) 
1964-81  -0.01  1.44  -0.01  1.42 
(2.2)  (12.5)  (3.1)  (19.8) 
1964-82  -0.01  1.50  -0.01  1.46 
(1.9)  (12.0)  (2.7)  (18.8) 
Sources:  Author's  calculations  using  data  from  table 1. 
a. Equation  estimated  is Inul = A + b, t + b2 Inu,  where  the dependent  variable  is the natural  logarithm  of the 
unemployment  rate  for males  aged  35-44 and for married  males;  t is a time  trend  and Inu  is the natural  logarithm  of 
the civilian  unemployment  rate;  t-statistics  are in parentheses. 
b. Data  for married  males  start  in 1955. 388  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
the union sector, and that  widening  wage differentials  have led recently 
displaced workers to choose to remain  unemployed  longer than they 
would  otherwise  have done. Summers  is less explicit  than  he might  have 
been concerning  the respective roles played by demand  factors per se 
versus noncompetitive  wage  differentials  in swelling  the flows of laid-off 
workers into unemployment  in recent years. However, it is plausible 
that  wage rigidity  in the high-wage  sectors has contributed  to job loss in 
those sectors. I find  it less plausible  that  reduced  willingness  on the part 
of today's displaced  workers  to accept alternate  employment  has been 
a significant  factor  in raising  the unemployment  rate. 
One  reason  for  my skepticism  regarding  this  second  part  of Summers's 
transitional  unemployment  story  is that  I find  it hard  to believe that  most 
unemployed mature men, particularly  unemployed married  men, are 
really  in a position  to wait very long for good  jobs. While  I don't want  to 
make  too much  of anecdotal  evidence, General  Motors'  experience  with 
its Guaranteed  Income Stream (GIS) program  comes to mind here. 
Under that program,  high-seniority  laid-off workers are entitled to a 
guaranteed income until they reach retirement age. The condition 
attached  to the guarantee  is that if offered a job at another  GM plant, 
even ajob halfway  across the country, the laid-off  worker  must accept 
it. The  jobs are not necessarily  attractive:  the worker  who moves starts 
over at the  bottom  of the  plant  seniority  ladder,  which  may  mean  working 
the night shift, performing  an onerous task, and being vulnerable  to 
temporary  layoff. According to Al Warren,  GM's Vice-President  for 
Industrial  Relations, married  men almost always accept offered  jobs 
rather  than  lose their  GIS eligibility,  whereas  single  men  are more  likely 
to turnjobs  down. His interpretation:  married  men simply  cannot  afford 
to be without  ajob, even if it is a worse  job than  they held before. 
Statistics on growth in the union-nonunion  wage differential  and in 
cross-industry wage differentials are the main evidence underlying 
Summers's view that the unemployed now have reason to hold out 
longer  in hopes of getting  their  old  jobs back. But the data on the union 
compensation  premium  in table 14 imply that while the union  premium 
did grow substantially  from  the early 1970s  through  1982,  by 1985  it had 
fallen  back  to its 1978  level. Similarly,  the Bell and  Freeman  data  in table 
15 show that cross-industry  wage dispersion  grew rapidly  before 1978, 
but less rapidly  between 1978 and 1985. Thus, the data do not offer 
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or high-wage-industry  jobs increased  substantially  over the 1978  to 1985 
period  during  which mature  male  unemployment  has risen. 
It should also be noted that neither growth in the union-nonunion 
wage differential  nor growth  in the dispersion  of average  wages across 
industries  necessarily  implies  an  increase  in the dispersion  of wage  offers 
available  to unemployed  workers, as would be necessary for standard 
search  models to predict  an increase  in the duration  of unemployment. 
Any conclusion regarding  the dispersion of wages among individuals 
requires  knowing  something  both about the relative  wages in different 
sorts ofjobs and about  the relative  shares  of employment  in those  jobs. 
All else the same, if the share  of employment  in high-wage  jobs shrinks 
and the share of employment  in average-wage  jobs rises, overall wage 
dispersion  will  tend  to fall. Over  the same  periods  that  increases  in union- 
nonunion  and  cross-industry  wage  differentials  have  occurred,  the union 
share  of total  employment  fell, and  the high-wage  industries  where  wage 
growth was most rapid experienced below-average  or even negative 
employment  growth. Without  more information,  it is impossible  to say 
what the net effect on overall wage dispersion was. But some added 
information  is available.  James Medoff has looked at the dispersion  of 
hourly  wage rates using Current  Population  Survey data  for the period 
1973 to 1984. He finds no increase in the dispersion  of hourly wages 
among  individuals.  ' Thus, even if it can be assumed  that  increases  in the 
dispersion  of wages paid to employed workers  translate  into increased 
dispersion of the wage offers made to the unemployed, the evidence 
does not establish  that  any such increase  has occurred. 
All in all, I am more prepared  to believe that the recent increase in 
mature  male unemployment  reflects increases in the numbers  of dis- 
placed workers than that it reflects on increased propensity of those 
displaced  workers  to hold out in hopes of getting  their  old  jobs back. 
Michael  L. Wachter: Lawrence  Summers  has done an admirablejob  of 
describing  the current  pattern  of unemployment.  Overall  I agree with 
his diagnoses of the problem. In my comments I want to discuss four 
aspects of the Summers  paper:  whether  the economy is indeed  near  full 
1. James  L. Medoff, "The Structure  of Hourly  Earnings  Among  U.S. Private  Sector 
Employees:  1973-1984"  (Harvard  University,  December  1984). 390  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
employment;  the appropriate  adjustments  to the unemployment  rate 
based on labor supply considerations;  the impact of noncompetitive 
wages on "wait" unemployment;  and the policy implications  of the 
research  findings. 
The first issue is the assumption  in the title of the paper that the 
economy is "near" full employment  at 7 percent. Although  Summers 
offers some evidence that is suggestive of a nonaccelerating  inflation 
rate of unemployment  (NAIRU) of 7 percent, the evidence is decidedly 
mixed,  and  Summers  seems unwilling  to take  a strong  stand  on the issue. 
For  example,  he mentions  that  the traditional  approach  of solving  a wage 
inflation equation for the unemployment  rate consistent with stable 
inflation  does not lead  to robust  equilibrium  unemployment  rates. Based 
on his evidence, a reader  (such  as myself) who believed  that  the NAIRU 
was 6 percent rather  than 7 percent would not be convinced to change 
his view of the matter. 
Whether  the economy's NAIRU is as low as 6 percent, or as high as 
7 percent, is important  to Summers's  interpretation  of the evidence. If 
we are near  full employment,  then it is legitimate  to compare 1985  with 
earlier  full-employment  years such as 1965  and 1978. In addition, the 
composition of the current  pool of unemployed  can be interpreted  as 
representing  structural  rather  than cyclical problems, and the change 
from 1965  to 1985  can  be studied  as reflecting  long-term  structural  trends 
in the unemployment  problem. 
The strongest  evidence that the economy is not at its NAIRU is the 
trend  in wage and  price  inflation  rates. Recent growth  rates  of wage and 
price are at levels not experienced since the early 1960s and, more 
important,  there  is little  evidence  that  inflation  rates  are  about  to increase. 
For example, the rate of increase of average  hourly  earnings  (AHE) is 
now below 3 percent  on an annual  basis. That  measure  of core inflation 
was 6.9 percent  in 1982  and then declined  annually  to 4.9 in 1983,  3.2 in 
1984,  3.0 in 1985,  and 2.6 percent  for the four quarters  ending  with the 
second quarter  of 1986.  The AHE current  rate of wage growth  may be 
artificially  depressed because of compositional  shifts in the economy, 
but even after those shifts are corrected  for, the conclusion is that the 
labor  market  is slack. The employment  cost index, which  is less subject 
to compositional  bias, is increasing  at a rate  closer to 4 than  to 3 percent, 
and  here again  the 1985-86 trend  has been down rather  than  up. 
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that the unemployment  rate has also been declining  slowly along with 
wage growth rates. Near full employment one might expect that the 
movement  up the short-run  Phillips  curve would offset any downward 
shift in that relationship  due to the lag in the adjustment  of inflation 
expectations. That is, near full employment  one might anticipate  that 
even slowly  declining  unemployment  rates  would  result  in at  least stable, 
and probably increasing, core rates of inflation. But this is not yet 
happening. 
If the economy's NAIRU is 6 rather  than 7 percent, then there is a 
substantial  amount  of cyclical unemployment  left in the economy. The 
point  is important  since individuals  in different  age-sex, education,  and 
industry  categories  experience  different  percentage  point  improvements 
when the economy makes its final approach  to NAIRU. Hence Sum- 
mers'  s conclusions  with  respect  to which  groups  have suffered  increased 
unemployment  rates since 1965  might  reflect  the remaining  cyclical gap 
rather  than  structural  forces. 
Putting  aside the NAIRU issue, I believe that Summers  makes an 
important  contribution  interpreting  today's structural  unemployment. 
His interpretation  is based on supply-side  characteristics  of the labor 
force  and  the related  importance  of the growth  in "wait"  unemployment. 
Summers  argues that earlier  attempts, including  my own, to adjust 
for demographic  factors were too focused on age-sex differences in 
unemployment  and ignored  other  important  differences,  such as educa- 
tional  attainment.  If unemployment  differs  among  groups  with different 
levels of education, industry of employment, or marital status, the 
omission of those factors results in a biased correction for age-sex 
effects. 
In  defense  of earlier  adjustments,  I note that  the youth  unemployment 
problem  of the 1970s  was reasonably  well approximated  by controlling 
for age and sex. In 1979,  for example, one-half  of the unemployed  were 
young  workers  between  the ages  of sixteen  and  twenty-four.  Distinctions 
based  on marital  status  and  educational  attainment  add  little insight  and 
might even introduce a bias. Youths are always disproportionately 
unmarried,  not divorced, and, especially in the case of teenagers, 
characterized  by a low level of educational  attainment.  Hence, interac- 
tion variables  between those characteristics  and age are important,  and 
their  exclusion  also poses omitted  variable  problems.  In the 1970s  it was 
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age-based  demographic  effects or longer-run  effects that would prove 
independent  of age. Now that youth unemployment  is declining,  there 
is more support  for including  those other variables  based on the belief 
that  trends  in those rates are not driven  by age factors. 
Summers's  analysis  indicates  that shifts in unemployment  by marital 
status are an important  part  of the structural  story. I believe that this is 
correct  but  that  the  underlying  mechanism  is marital  status  in  conjunction 
with the number  of wage earners  in a family. It is certainly  the case that 
the number  of families  with two wage earners  has been increasing,  and 
search theory implies that these families should have higher rates of 
unemployment. Similarly, single-parent,  female-headed families are 
likely to experience  high unemployment  incidence because of frequent 
transition  into and  out of the labor  force. Unfortunately,  the quantitative 
importance  of these factors  is difficult  to test given the available  data. 
With  respect  to labor  supply  corrections,  Summers  argues  that  earlier 
age-sex adjustments  in estimating  NAIRU should  result  in a finding  of a 
lower NAIRU today. Hence if NAIRU today is 7 percent, then those 
corrections  can  be presumed  to be incorrect.  But  this  conclusion  assumes 
that the economy has returned  to full employment, a point that is not 
proved in the paper. My own recent work does suggest that youth 
unemployment  in particular  has been declining  relative  to adult  rates. If 
the current  NAIRU is 6 percent,  then adjusting  for the GNP cyclical gap 
results  in youth unemployment  rates lower than  their 1978  full-employ- 
ment levels. The one important  exception to this conclusion is black 
males aged eighteen  to twenty-four. 
I agree strongly  with Summers's  arguments  concerning  the impor- 
tance of union wage differentials  in causing unemployment.  Although 
Summers  refers  to this type of unemployment  as transitional  unemploy- 
ment, it is useful to use the term "wait" unemployment. Whereas 
transitional  unemployment  can represent  almost any form of frictional 
or structural  unemployment,  the labor economics literature  uses the 
wait unemployment  terminology  to refer to that unemployment  that 
arises from the rationing  of high-wage  jobs in a non-market-clearing 
sector. Summers's  conclusions with respect to the impact of noncom- 
petitive  wages  on unemployment  support  my current  research  with  Peter 
Linneman. 
In calculating  a cross-sectional  time series of union wage premiums 
for each year between 1973  and 1984,  Linneman  and I found that union Lawrence H. Summers  393 
wage premiums  increased  strongly  during  the late 1970s  and  early 1980s, 
often by as much as 50 percent over the period. We then used the 
estimated  industry-union  premiums  as explanatory  variables  in  a second- 
stage cross-sectional  time series regression  to explain  changes  in union- 
nonunion shares of employment. The results from this second-stage 
equation  show a quantitatively  large  and statistically  significant  impact 
of industry-union  premiums  on employment  shares.  These  results  across 
industries support Summers's findings  where the data base is across 
states. 
Although  the evidence supports  the contention  that noncompetitive 
wage differentials  cause wait unemployment,  it does not tell us whether 
the problem is likely to prove long lasting or transitional.  Although 
Summers  may be tilting  toward  the long-lasting  nature  of the problem,  a 
case can be made  that  it is transitional. 
Whether  one waits for a job with a noncompetitive  wage or quickly 
accepts a competitive wage depends not only on the size of the wage 
differential  but also on the probability  of being hired  and receiving  that 
wage premium  job. In the 1970s  wait unemployment  was concentrated 
among young or entry-level  workers who could expect some turnover 
in noncompetitive  high-wage  public service  jobs and, to a lesser extent, 
in union  jobs. There was good incentive to look for those jobs, either 
because they were funded  by the government  and relatively  insensitive 
to economic  conditions  or  because the union  sector's structural  problem 
had  not yet emerged  across a broad  range  of industries. 
In other words, during  the 1970s  the probability  of finding  ajob with 
a noncompetitive  wage was higher  than it has been in the 1980s. More 
specifically, the probability  of a successful wait was high enough to 
encourage waiting on the part of  the new entrant group or those 
unemployed  from  nonpremium  wage  jobs. During  the 1980s,  the proba- 
bility  of landing  such ajob has been declining.  Those who have lost such 
ajob might  still be expected to wait in hope of landing  a new  job. In any 
cyclical bounce they might be  recalled. Moreover, the process of 
adjusting  one's reservation  wage  downward  takes  time.  But  new  entrants 
or  workers  employed  elsewhere  are  unlikely  to be attracted  to the queue. 
Their  probability  of finding  ajob in the declining  union sector is simply 
too low. 
My final comment concerns Summers's short section covering his 
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dation  that  rising  rates  of adult  male  unemployment,  although  a problem, 
should  not be addressed  by expansionary  monetary  and fiscal policies. 
Although  the paper  is silent  on whether  rising  adult  male  unemployment 
rates should  be addressed  by structural  policies, that appears  to be the 
implicit  message. The issue is relevant  because of the current  debate  on 
whether funding  for disadvantaged  youth programs  should be shifted 
toward  programs  that  assist displaced  adult  males. 
The problem  of structural  unemployment,  however, cannot  be easily 
addressed. There is a need to target  funding  toward  particular  groups. 
The issue is to identify  variables  that rank  pockets of structural  unem- 
ployment in terms of their need for policy assistance. There is no 
particular  reason to assume that groups  with increasing  rates of unem- 
ployment are the ones to be targeted for assistance. Such a variable 
would lead toward continuing assistance for disadvantaged  youths, 
depending  on their family income. If this were used to rank groups, 
disadvantaged  youths and single-parent  families would continue to be 
targeted. 
General  Discussion 
Martin  Baily pointed  out that  while the adjustments  Summers  makes 
for post-1965  changes  in the age-sex composition  of the labor  force alter 
the 1985  unemployment  rate only slightly, even Summers's  procedure 
shows that  the changes  added  1.0  percentage  point  to the unemployment 
rate between 1954  and 1978. The Perry  procedure  weighted each age- 
sex group  by the relative  earnings  of its workers  and yielded an adjust- 
ment  for the same  period  in the neighborhood  of 2.0 percentage  points. 
Christopher  Sims noted that the models whose results are shown in 
tables 12 and 13 provide only weak evidence for union effects on 
unemployment  and employment. The most reliably specified models 
include  regional  dummies  and  an  instrumented  union  variable;  the  largest 
t-statistic on any union variable in any of these models is only 1.7. 
Summers felt that controlling  for regional effects probably obscured 
some of the union  effects and noted that regional  controls  increased  the 
standard errors but did not decrease the magnitudes of the union 
coefficients. 
Jeffrey Sachs stressed that increased unemployment  could not be 
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interpretation  is that  exogenous supply  shocks  have led to both  declining 
employment  in the union sector and declining  wages in the nonunion 
sector, producing  the pattern  of correlations  Summers  reports in the 
second half of the paper. Summers agreed that rising union wage 
premiums  probably  reflected  wage rigidity  in the face of adverse shocks 
rather  than  pure  union  push. 
Stanley  Fischer, noting  that  in  previous  work  Summers  had  explained 
high European  unemployment  as a consequence of employed  workers' 
keeping  wages high even when others are out of work, asked why the 
same interpretation  was not applicable  to the United States. Summers 
replied  that a key difference  between the United States and Europe is 
the presence of a large nonunion sector in the United States. The 
explanations  that he and others have offered for the rigidity  of union 
wages do not apply to the U.S.  nonunion sector. To explain U.S. 
unemployment,  one must explain why the U.S. nonunion  sector does 
not soak  up  any unemployment  generated  in the high-wage  union  sector. 
This is the reason for introducing  the transitional  unemployment  inter- 
pretation. 
Wayne Vroman questioned Summers's contention that remaining 
unemployed  to wait for a good  job has become more  attractive  in recent 
years. According to Summers, people who lose high-paying  jobs find 
that  the prospective  wage in their  next best alternativejob  has declined. 
Thus they wait longer to regain their former  jobs. But Vroman  cited 
evidence that other sources of family  income-unemployment benefits 
and earnings of other family members-have  declined since the late 
1970s,  so that  family  income during  an unemployed  worker's  wait for a 
job is lower than it used to be. The effect would be to shorten the 
equilibrium  duration  of unemployment. 
Vroman  noted that both he and Gary Burtless have documented  a 
decline  in the availability  of unemployment  insurance  benefits.  A similar 
decline  is shown in table 6 of the Summers  paper. The cutbacks, which 
occurred  after 1979, have been largest in programs  for the long-term 
unemployed.  They have also been largest  in the major  industrial  states 
that  have experienced  especially high  unemployment  in the 1980s.  Thus 
the cutback  in unemployment  insurance  benefits  has been concentrated 
among  the  same  workers  whose unemployment  experience  has  worsened 
the most. 
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unemployed  pointed in the same direction of reduced incentives and 
ability to hold out for high-paying  jobs. Pretransfer  poverty rates for 
individuals  in each category  of unemployment  duration  were uniformly 
higher  in 1983  than in 1976.  Real wages of other family members  were 
stagnant  over the period.  Vroman  concluded  that  these findings,  coupled 
with  the cutbacks  in unemployment  insurance  benefits,  strongly  suggest 
that the unemployed in general, and the long-term unemployed in 
particular,  were worse off waiting  for a job in the 1980s  than  they were 
in the 1970s. 
Alan Blinder  suggested  that  one direct  test of Summers's  transitional 
unemployment  hypothesis  would  be to look at unemployment  durations 
for people grouped  by the difference  between their  actual  wage and the 
wage predicted  for someone with their  human  capital  characteristics.  If 
Summers's  theory  is correct,  those with  higher-than-predicted  wages on 
their previous jobs  should have longer-than-average  unemployment 
durations. 
Robert  Gordon  proposed  the following  question  regarding  the nature 
of today's unemployment:  if the U.S. monetary-fiscal  policy mix, the 
trade  deficit,  and  the relative  decline  in manufacturing  employment  were 
reversed, how much would the married  male unemployment  rate fall? 
In Gordon's  view, it was hard  to imagine  that  it would  not return  to near 
its level before the trade deficit grew. In this sense, the increased 
unemployment  of recent years fundamentally  reflects demand rather 
than supply developments. Martin  Feldstein agreed that an important 
part of  mature male unemployment reflected the dramatic loss  of 
manufacturing  jobs due to growth in the U.S. trade deficit. While he 
would not advocate  generalized  demand  stimulus,  Feldstein  did predict 
that the improved health of the manufacturing  sector that could be 
expected from the lower dollar should reduce the unemployment  rate 
among  these older men. Robert Hall also regarded  the unprecedented 
shrinkage  in durable  goods production  in recent years as an important 
cause of current  high mature  male unemployment.  He reasoned that 
those who lose  "career" jobs may hold two or three jobs in quick 
succession before  finding  another  "career"  job, so that  a single  job loss 
may  generate  several  rounds  of unemployment. 